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Con ress enacted the ndian Child Welfare Act CWA in to
address abuses by state and private child welfare a encies that resulted in the
forced removal of rou hly one third of all ndian children from their families.
However, four decades after the passa e of the law, opponents of CWA make
the novel ar ument that it impermissibly commandeers the States, in violation
of the enth Amendment. n rackeen v. ernhardt a decision that
contradicted much of modern anti commandeerin doctrine the .S.
District Court for the orthern District of e as became the first court to
declare CWA unconstitutional. he anti commandeerin challen e to CWA
threatens to upend much of federal ndian law and to disrupt the delicate
balance of power amon states, tribes, and the federal overnment. his ote
refutes the claim that CWA commandeers the States. he commandeerin
claims advanced a ainst CWA contradict settled Supreme Court doctrine and
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misconstrue the practical application of the statute. nder a proper readin
of modern anti commandeerin urisprudence and an informed
understandin of how state child custody proceedin s work, it is clear that
CWA falls well within the bounds of the enth Amendment.
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hey too know all too well that some cracks were built ust for us to fall
throu h. We live in a world that tries to steal spirits each day they steal ours
by takin us away. Tanaya Winder, Duckwater Shoshone Tribe1INTROD CTIONWhen Alvetta ames, the daughter of a Nava o medicine woman,attempted to adopt her great-nephew, babyA.L.M., she stepped directly intothe crosshairs of a powerfully organi ed movement working to dismantletribal sovereignty.2 The story of her foiled adoption started when the Stateof Texas began proceedings to terminate the parental rights of A.L.M.’sbiological parents, both enrolled members of federally recogni ed Indiantribes.3Pursuant to the Indian ChildWelfareAct of 1978 (ICWA)4 a federalstatute regulating child custody proceedings involving Indian children asdefined by the law a Texas social worker notified the Nava o Nation of thecase.5 The Nava o Nation, the tribe of A.L.M.’s biological mother, then beganthe search for a Nava o adoptive placement.6 In the interim, the TexasDepartment of Family and Protective Services temporarily placed A.L.M.with a white evangelical foster family, the rackeens.7
1. TanayaWinder, Love Lessons in a ime of Settler Colonialism, POETRYMAG. ( un.2018), https: www.poetryfoundation.org poetrymaga ine poems146709 love-lessons-in-a-time-of-settler-colonialismhttps: perma.cc T9 C-WV F .2. See an Hoffman, Who Can Adopt a ative American Child A e as Couple vs.
ribes, N.Y. TIMES ( une 5, 2019), https: www.nytimes.com 2019 06 05health nava o-children-custody-fight.html https: perma.cc CV6R-558L .3. See rackeen v. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514, 525 (N.D. Tex. 2018), rev d sub
nom. rackeen v. ernhardt, 937 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2019) (A.L.M.’s mother isan enrolled member of the Nava o Nation, and A.L.M.’s father is an enrolledmember of the Cherokee Nation).4. 25 .S.C. 1901-1963 (2018).5. Brackeen, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 525.6. d. rief in Support of the Nava o Nation’s Motion to Intervene as Defendantfor the Limited Purpose of Seeking Dismissal Pursuant to Rule 19 hereinafterNava o rief at 1, rackeen v. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (No.4:17-cv-00868-O, Doc. 78), rev d sub nom. rackeen v. ernhardt, 937 F.3d406 (5th Cir. 2019).7. rackeen v. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 525 Hoffman, supra note 2.
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The Nava o Nation found Ms. ames ready and willing to adopt.8 Shealready had close relationshipswith A.L.M.’s four siblings, who came to visittwice a week and were eager to have A.L.M. back in their lives.9 Ms. amesdrove sixteen hours to a family court hearing in FortWorth, Texas, to obtaincustody of A.L.M.10 The State of New Mexico, where she lived, arranged ababy shower for her in anticipation.11ut as Ms. ames prepared to reunite her family, the rackeens filed foradoption.12 At first, the rackeens lost. The Texas family court found thatthe rackeens had not shown good cause to depart from ICWA, whichprioriti es adoptive placements of Indian children with members of theirtribes.13 ut the rackeens now represented by Gibson Dunn CrutcherLLP14 and backed by the Goldwater Institute appealed the decision andobtained an emergency stay.15 When Ms. ames learned that the appealsprocess could take years to complete, she worried that the delay would
8. Hoffman, supra note 2.9. d.10. d.11. Opposed Motion of Nava o Nation to Intervene or to File rief as AmicusCuriae hereinafter Nava o Opposed Motion at 11, rackeen v. ernhardt,937 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2019) (No. 18-11479) Nava o rief, supra note 6, at 3.12. See rackeen v. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 525 Nava o Opposed Motion, supranote 11, at 11.13. Nava o Opposed Motion, supra note 11, at 11 see also 25 .S.C. 1915(a)(2018) ( In any adoptive placement of an Indian child under State law, apreference shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to aplacement with (1) a member of the child’s extended family (2) othermembers of the Indian child’s tribe or (3) other Indian families. ).14. See rief of Amicus Curiae Goldwater Institute in Support of Appellants C.E. .and . . . hereinafter Goldwater Amicus rief at 26, n re Interest of A.L.M.-F., 564 S.W.3d 441 (Tex. App. 2017) (Nos. 323-103401-16 323-105593-17),https: goldwaterinstitute.org wp-content uploads 2017 10 Amicus-brief-of-the-Goldwater-Institute.pdf https: perma.cc AN42-Y3 . Whilechild custody briefs are generally unavailable to the public, the certificate ofservice in Goldwater’s amicus brief shows that appellants were representedbyMatthewMcGill at Gibson, Dunn Crutcher LLP. d. see also Scott Edelmanatie Marquart, Pro Bono ewsletter, GI SON D NN (Fall 2018),https: www.gibsondunn.com wp-content uploads 2018 10Pro onoNewsletter-1018.html https: perma.cc 9E R-HC .15. Nava o rief, supra note 6, at 3 Nava o Opposed Motion, supra note 11, at 11.
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ultimately make A.L.M.’s transition harder.16 Out of concern for her great-nephew, she withdrew her petition for adoption.17The rackeens did not stop at obtaining custody of A.L.M. Claimingmental anguish due to ICWA’s collateral attack provision which allows theparents of Indian children to petition to withdraw their consent fromadoptions obtained by fraud or duress within two years after theadoption18 the rackeens initiated a lawsuit to dismantle ICWA itself.19Their case, Brackeen v. Bernhardt,20 has already made history. In 2018, the.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas became the first federalcourt to declare ICWA unconstitutional on the basis of impermissiblecommandeering of the States, impermissible race-based discrimination,and impermissible delegation of federal legislative power to Indian tribes.21After the historic lower court ruling, a three- udge panel of the Fifth Circuitreversed, upholding ICWA’s constitutionality.22 Plaintiffs moved forrehearing, which the Fifth Circuit granted, vacating the panel’s decision andsitting en banc for argument on anuary 22, 2020 as of this writing, adecision was pending.23 If the Fifth Circuit holds ICWA unconstitutional, itis likely that the Supreme Court will review the case.24 In recent cycles, the
16. Nava o rief, supra note 6, at 3.17. See Nava o Opposed Motion, supra note 11, at 4 Nava o rief, supra note 6, at3.18. 25 .S.C. 1913(d) (2018).19. See Complaint and Prayer for Declaratory and In unctive Relief at 2, rackeenv. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (No. 4:17-cv-00868-O), rev d sub
nom. rackeen v. ernhardt, 937 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2019) (alleging that ICWAcommandeers state agencies and courts to become investigative andexecutive actors carrying out federal policy and to make child custodydecisions based on racial preferences ).20. 937 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2019).21. rackeen v. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514, 536, 538, 541 (N.D. Tex. 2018).22. rackeen v. ernhardt, 937 F.3d 406, 441 (5th Cir. 2019).23. See Chad Brackeen v. David Bernhardt , CO RTLISTENERhttps: www.courtlistener.com docket 8345738 chad-brackeen-v-david-bernhardt https: perma.cc 9N R- N5Z .24. See Andrew . Coan, Judicial Capacity and the Substance of Constitutional Law,122 YALE L. . 422, 439-41 (2012) (stating that a lower court’s decision toinvalidate an act of Congress constitutes a high-stakes domain meaning thatthe Supreme Court feels strongly compelled to grant review ).
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Court has also demonstrated a considerable interest in reviewing cases thatdirectly impact Indian tribes.25A Supreme Court ruling overturning ICWA would be disastrous for the574 federally recogni ed Indian tribes26 that rely on its safeguards.Following decades of widespread abuses by state childwelfare agencies andprivate entities,27 ICWA established minimum Federal standards for allchild custody proceedings involving Indian children.28Dismantling it wouldundo these critical protections and place Indian children at risk.Even more fundamentally, because of the nature of some of thePlaintiffs’ arguments, a ruling in their favor could eopardi e the entirecorpus of federal law that governs Indian affairs today. 29 There are twoprimary dangers. The first the implications of which have been widelydiscussed30 comes from the claim that ICWA, by singling out Indians fordifferential treatment, violates the Equal Protection Clause.31 As theSupreme Court notes, if legislation applying differential treatment to
25. SeeMcGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020) (reviewingwhether Oklahomacan exercise criminal urisdiction over an Indian defendant) Sharp v.Murphy,140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020) (same) United States v. Cooley, 919 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir.
2019), cert. granted, No. 19-1414 (U.S. Nov. 20, 2020) (Mem.) (reviewing the
scope of a tribe’s authority to temporarily detain and search non-Indians on a public
right-of-way within a reservation), https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders
/courtorders/112020zr1_q861.pdf [https://perma.cc/KRU3-XTSE].26. See ndian Entities Reco ni ed by and Eli ible to Receive Services from the
nited States Bureau of ndian Affairs, 85 Fed. Reg. 5462 ( an. 30, 2020). Foran explanation of federal recognition of tribes, see ureau of Indian Affairs,
Fre uently Asked uestions, .S. DEP’T INTERIOR, https: www.bia.govfrequently-asked-questions https: perma.cc 9FGP-NET .27. See infra Section I.A.28. 25 .S.C. 1902 (2018).29. See Leah Litman Mathew L.M. Fletcher, he ecessity of the ndian Child
Welfare Act, ATLANTIC ( an. 22, 2020), https: www.theatlantic.com ideasarchive 2020 01 fifth-circuit-icwa 605167 https: perma.cc WM9 -GS4V .30. See, e. ., Sarah rakoff, heyWereHere First American ndian ribes, Race, and
the Constitutional Minimum, 69 STAN. L. REV. 491 (2017) Allison rause Elder,
ndian As a Political Classification Readin the ribe Back into the ndian
Child Welfare Act, 13 N.W. L. REV. 417 (2018) Gregory Ablavsky, With the
ndian ribes Race, Citi enship and the ri inal Constitutional Meanin s, 70STAN. L. REV. 1025 (2018).31. .S. CONST. amend. IV, 1.
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Indians were deemed invidious racial discrimination, an entire Title of thenited States Code (25 .S.C.) would be effectively erased and the solemncommitment of the Government toward the Indians would beeopardi ed. 32 The second which has not yet been addressed in thescholarly literature comes from the rackeens’ novel claim that ICWAimpermissibly commandeers state courts and executive agencies by forcingthem to apply federal standards in child custody proceedings involvingIndian children. If ICWA were to be held unconstitutional based onimpermissible commandeering, the entire scheme of federal law governingthe relationship between states and tribes would be thrown into question.Pursuant to its trust obligation, the federal government has protected tribalsovereignty from the encroachment of the States.33 Without the power toprevent state legislatures, agencies, and courts from chipping away at tribalsovereignty, the federal government would be unable to play this crucialrole.This Note argues that ICWA does not commandeer the States. Part Igrounds the discussion in the history of genocide and coloni ation of Indianpeoples. This historical context is crucial to understanding the passage ofICWA and the current reactionary effort to dismantle it. Part II provides abrief overview of the anti-commandeering doctrine and lays out thecommandeering claims that opponents have leveled against ICWA.Additionally, this Part argues that ICWA fully aligns with modern anti-commandeering doctrine for four reasons. First, it is settled doctrine thatstate courts must enforce federal law. As such, anti-commandeeringdoctrine does not apply to state courts in the same way as it applies to thestate political branches. Second, Congress may impose federal procedureson state courts to vindicate federal rights, federal causes of action, and weargue vital federal interests, including the protection of the federal trustobligation to Indian tribes. The procedural requirements imposed by ICWAon state courts fall within all three of these categories. Third, it isestablished doctrine that Congress may impose record-keepingrequirements on the States, including the record-keeping required by ICWA.Fourth, contrary to the claims of its opponents, ICWA even-handedlyregulates states and private entities, consistent with the Constitution’s anti-commandeering requirements. Part III explains the dangerous implicationsof the anti-commandeering argument for tribal sovereignty, demonstratingthe high stakes of ICWA litigation for federal Indian law more broadly. TheNote concludes with an exploration of how attacks on ICWA based on anti-
32. Morton v. Mancari, 417 .S. 535, 552 (1974).33. For a discussion of the federal trust obligation, see infra Sec. III.A.
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commandeering doctrine threaten the very structure of federalism in thenited States.I. AC GRO ND
A. Historical Conte tThe crisis of forced child removals from Indian communities in thenited States reaches back to the genocide and forced displacement ofIndians by early settlers and later, by the federal government.34 After theIndian population was nearly annihilated by disease, forced relocation,massacre, and sterili ation,35 the nited States enacted a policy ofassimilation to culturally eradicate remaining Indian communities.36 In1867, the .S. Commissioner of Indian Affairs reported to Congress that theonly successful way to deal with the Indian problem’ was to separate theIndian children completely from their tribes. 37 At around the same time,government and private agencies began to steal thousands of Indianchildren from their tribes, forcing them to attend abusive boarding schoolsfor white cultural indoctrination.38 The explicit philosophy of this offensivewas to kill the Indian . . . , and save the man. 39 In these boarding schoolsfunded by federal civili ation fund s , 40 Indian children were beaten,starved, denied adequate healthcare, and punished for any attempts to
34. See enerally EFFREY OSTLER, S RVIVING GENOCIDE: NATIVE NATIONS AND THENITED STATES FROM THEAMERICANREVOL TION TO LEEDING ANSAS (2019).35. See Russell Thornton, ative American Demo raphic and ribal Survival into
the wenty First Century, 46 AM. ST D. 23, 24 (2005).36. See enerally ATHERINE ELLINGHA S, LOOD WILL TELL: NATIVE AMERICANS ANDASSIMILATION POLICY (2017).37. H.R. REP. NO. 104-808, at 15 (1996) (reporting the history of forcedassimilation).38. See enerally RENDA . CHILD, OARDING SCHOOL SEASONS: AMERICAN INDIANFAMILIES, 1900-1940 (1998).39. Richard H. Pratt, he Advanta es of Min lin ndians with Whites, inPROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CHARITIES AND CORRECTION AT THENINETEENTHANN AL SESSION 46 (Isabel C. arrows ed., 1892).40. H.R. REP. NO. 104-808, at 15 (1996).
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practice their religions, speak their languages, or maintain their cultures.41At the infamousCarlisle Indian Industrial School in Pennsylvania, the bodiesof abused and neglected Indian children lie in 186 graves.42In the early twentieth century, religious groups and state child welfareagencies across the country began to use mass adoption of Indian childrenas an assimilation tactic.43 State child welfare workers removed thousandsof children from their families without due process,44 frequently allegingneglect or abandonment when none existed.45 For example, while it iscustomary practice for Indian parents to leave their children in the care ofextended families, state social workers labeled this communal childcaremodel as abuse.46 Or, in a particularly sweeping case, state child welfareworkers on the Rosebud Sioux Reservation removed Indian children fromtheir families on the basis of their very existence on a reservation, whichaccording to state social workers was an inherently unacceptableenvironment for children.47The results were cataclysmic for Indian communities. y the mid-1970s, roughly one third of all Indian children had been removed from theirfamilies by either state child welfare agencies or private entities.48 Of thoseremoved, eighty-five percent were placed outside of their communities.49Terry Cross, founding director of the National Indian Child Welfare
41. SeeMathew L.M. Fletcher Wenona T. Singel, ndian Children and the Federal
ribal rust Relationship, 95 NE . L. REV. 885, 929-30 (2017) renda . Child,
he Boardin School as Metaphor, 57 . AM. INDIANED. 37, 38, 44-45 (2018).42. acqueline Fear-Segal, nstitutional Death and Ceremonial Healin Far from
Home he Carlisle ndian School Cemetery, 33 M SE MANTH. 157, 157 (2010).43. See Fletcher Singel, supra note 41, at 952-55.44. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 11 (1978).45. d. at 10.46. d.47. See ndian Child Welfare Pro ram Hearin s before the Subcomm. on ndian
Affairs of the S. Comm. on nterior and nsular Affairs, 93rd Cong. 215-16(1974) hereinafter Hearin s (statement of William yler, ExecutiveDirector, Association on American Indian Affairs).48. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 9 (1978).49. Settin the Record Strai ht he ndian Child Welfare Act Fact Sheet, NAT’LINDIAN CHILD WELFARE ASS’N 1 (2018), https: www.nicwa.org wp-contentuploads 2018 10 Setting-the-Record-Straight-2018.pdfhttps: perma.cc 536E- 3AC .
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Association, hauntingly recounts, There were literally American Indiancommunities where there were no children. 50Indian communities fought for their children. In a series of historiccongressional hearings, Native people shared the devastating impact offorced child removals. Cheryl DeCoteau, a member of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe, testified that a South Dakota child welfare workerhad removed her children to foster care without any process.51 Sherecounted,The child welfare worker said that I wasn’t a very good motherand everything, and that my children were better off being in awhite home where they were adopted out, or in this home,wherever theywere. They could buy all this stuff that I couldn’t givethem and give them all the love that I couldn’t give them.52After recording countless testimonies and collecting exhaustivestatistical research, a congressionally appointed commission found that theremoval of Indian children from their natural homes and tribal setting hasbeen and continues to be a national crisis. 53 The commission further foundthat the .S. government had failed to protect the most valuable resourceof any tribe its children, and that the policy of the nited States shouldbe to do all within its power to ensure that Indian children remain in Indianhomes. 54In a watershed moment, Congress responded by enacting the IndianChild Welfare Act ( ICWA ) of 1978.55 The law established minimumfederal standards for all child custody proceedings involving Indianchildren,56 defined as any unmarried personwho is under age eighteen andis either (a) amember of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in
50. athryn oyce, he Adoption Crunch, the Christian Ri ht, and the Challen e to
ndian Soverei nty, P . EYE (Feb. 23, 2014),https: www.politicalresearch.org 2014 02 23 adoption-crunch-christian-right-and-challenge-indian-sovereignty https: perma.cc 5AYW-VR 3 .51. Hearin s, supra note 47, at 64-71 (statement of Cheryl DeCoteau,Sisseton, South Dakota).52. d. at 66.53. S. REP. NO. 77- 892-4, at 87 (1978).54. d.55. 25 .S.C. 1901-1963 (2018).56. 25 .S.C. 1902 (2018).
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW 39 : 292 2020
302
an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe. 57The law provided Indian tribes with exclusive urisdiction over any childcustody proceeding involving Indian children domiciled on theirreservations.58While state courts retained urisdiction (concurrentwith thetribes’ urisdiction) over child custody proceedings for Indian childrenoutside the reservations, the law required state courts to transfer suchproceedings to tribal urisdiction in the absence of good cause to thecontrary.59 When state courts retained urisdiction, the law gave Indiantribes, parents, and custodians the right to intervene.60In addition to its urisdictional provisions, ICWA introduced aplacement preference for any adoptive placement of an Indian child.61 Thelaw required that preference be given, in the absence of good cause to thecontrary, to (1) amember of the child’s extended family (2) othermembersof the Indian child’s Tribe or (3) other Indian families.62 The law requiredsimilar placement preferences for foster care,63 maximi ing theopportunities for Indian children to remain in their communities.ICWA further instituted a series of procedural safeguards for Indianparents and custodians. Perhaps most important is the requirement thatany party seeking to remove an Indian child from their home first makeactive efforts to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programsdesigned to prevent the breakup of the Indian family. 64 Other safeguardsinclude the right to appointed counsel for indigent Indian parents andcustodians65 and informed consent rules for voluntary foster care orvoluntary termination of parental rights proceedings.66 Furthermore,neither foster care placements nor termination of parental rights may beordered without proof that the parent or Indian custodian’s continued
57. 25 .S.C. 1903 (2018).58. 25 .S.C. 1911 (2018).59. d.60. d. see also Miss. and of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 .S. 30, 48-49(1989) (deciding that ICWA applies to Indian children living both on and offreservations).61. 25 .S.C. 1915(a) (2018).62. d.63. 25 .S.C. 1915(b) (2018).64. 25 .S.C. 1912(d) (2018).65. 25 .S.C. 1912(b) (2018).66. 25 .S.C. 1913 (2018).
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custody would result in serious emotional or physical damage to thechild. 67 Finally, in the event that a foster care placement or termination ofparental rights is completed in violation of ICWA, the statute provides bothstate and federal causes of action for Indian children, parents, custodians,and tribes to invalidate the proceeding.68Since the passage of ICWA, national child welfare organi ations havecalled it the gold standard for child welfare policies and practices thatshould be afforded to all children. 69 Indian children are removed from theirhomes at a lower rate than they were before ICWA.70 However, complianceis inconsistent and implementation data is scarce.71 Indian children are stillthree times more likely to be removed by state child welfare systems thannon-Indian children.72 In Maine, widespread noncompliance with ICWA ledto the formation of the Maine Wabanaki-State Child Welfare Truth andReconciliation Commission in 2013.73The Commission’s final report, signedby the governor of Maine and five tribal chiefs, found that even after thepassage of ICWA, Indian children in Maine entered foster care at 5.1 timesthe rate of non-Native children.74 In 2013, the Oglala Sioux Tribe and
67. 25 .S.C. 1912(e)-(f) (2018).68. 25 .S.C. 1914 (2018).69. See rief for Casey Family Programs et al., at 2, Adoptive Couple v. aby Girl,570 .S. 637 (2013) (No. 12-399).70. See ason R. Williams et al., A Research and Practice Brief Measurin
Compliance with the ndian ChildWelfare Act, CASEY FAMILYPROGRAMS 6 (2015),https: www.casey.org media measuring-compliance-icwa.pdfhttps: perma.cc YRD2-WR22 (referring to overall decreases in rates ofout-of-home placements since ICWA’s enactment).71. See id.72. NAT’L INDIAN CHILDWELFAREASS’N, supra note 49, at 1.73. See enerally Maine Wabanaki-State Child Welfare Truth ReconciliationCommission, Beyond the Mandate Continuin the Conversation (2015),https: d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net mainewabanakireach pages 17attachments original 1468974047 TRC-Report-Expandeduly2015.pdf 1468974047 https: perma.cc C72Z-8 2 .74. See id. at 64. For a listing of the federally recogni ed tribes inMaine, see IndianEntities Recogni ed by and Eligible to Receive Services from the nited Statesureau of Indian Affairs, 85 Fed. Reg. 5462 ( an. 30, 2020). While the .S.recogni es the Passamaquoddy as a single tribe with reservations at bothIndian Township and Pleasant Point, the Passamaquoddy recogni esubstantial autonomy in each community, each with its own chief. See
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Rosebud Sioux Tribe brought a class action lawsuit against South Dakotastate officials claiming widespread defiance of ICWA.75 At that time, Indianscomprised less than nine percent of South Dakota’s population but fifty-twopercent of the children in the state’s foster care system.76In 2016, theDepartment of Interior for the first time promulgated a ruleto support increased compliance with ICWA, including a national datacollection scheme.77 This is an important step toward fulfilling the law’spromise to protect the best interests of Indian children and promote thestability and security of Indian tribes and families. 78Tribes’ very existencesdepend on it.
B. he Conservative A enda Drivin Attempts to Dismantle CWAIt is only in the past decade that concerted attacks on ICWA have begunin earnest. In 2013, anti-ICWA lawyer Lori Alvino McGill79 represented anon-Indian couple seeking to adopt an infant citi en of the Cherokee nationin the infamous Supreme Court case known as aby Veronica, formallycalled Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl.80 At the time, Ms. McGill was a partner atthe corporate law firm Latham Watkins, which characteri ed her work on
Government, PASSAMA ODDY TRI E, https: www.passamaquoddy.compage id 9 https: perma.cc W 5 -M 4P Pleasant Point ribal
Government, PASSAMA ODDY AT SIPAYI , http: www.wabanaki.comwabanaki new chief council.html https: perma.cc NG9 -ZSR .75. See Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and In unctive Relief at 2, OglalaSioux Tribe v. Van Hunnik, 993 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (D.S.D. 2014) (No. 13-cv-05020- LV), rev d sub. nom. Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Fleming, 904 F.3d 603 (8thCir. 2018).76. See Stephen Pevar, n South Dakota, fficials Defied a Federal Jud e and ook
ndian Kids Away from heir Parents in Ri ed Proceedin s, ACL (Feb. 22,2017, 5:00 PM), https: www.aclu.org blog racial- ustice american-indian-rights south-dakota-officials-defied-federal- udge-and-tookhttps: perma.cc PT8Z-MV .77. See 25 C.F.R. 23.140-42 (2020).78. 25 .S.C. 1902 (2018).79. Wilkinson Walsh Partner Lori Alvino McGill Featured on Le al alk etwork
and Radiolab, WIL INSON WALSH ( une 17, 2016),https: www.wilkinsonwalsh.com lori-alvino-mcgill-featured-on-legal-talk-network-and-radiolab https: perma.cc S646-SP7S .80. 570 .S. 637 (2013). The non-Native couple prevailed. See id. at 642.
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the case as pro bono. 81 Powerful interests in the adoption industry, theChristian adoption movement, and the anti-tribal sovereignty lobby filedamicus briefs on behalf of the non-Indian couple, who ultimately woncustody of the Cherokee infant.82 The ma ority’s reference to unspecifiedequal protection concerns suggest that the Court might be receptive tofuture claims that ICWA violates the Equal Protection Clause.83On the heels of the blockbuster aby Veronica case, the GoldwaterInstitute launched a coordinated attack on ICWA.84 Despite never havingworked to improve the educational, economic, or health circumstances ofIndian children, Goldwater created a subsidiary organi ation misleadinglycalled Equal Protection for Native Children. 85 The organi ation’s coreob ective is to dismantle ICWA.86 Since 2015, Goldwater has litigated at leasteight cases87 against ICWA and filed amicus briefs in support of at least four
81. Doin Good, Hour by Hour Pro Bono Annual Review, LATHAM WAT INS21 (2013), https: www.lw.com content AnnualReport20132013Pro onoAnnualReview files assets basic-html page21.htmlhttps: perma.cc 5CWP-CS 3 .82. See riefs of Amici Curiae Nat’l Council for Adoption Am. Acad. AdoptionAttorneys Adoptive Parents Comm., Inc. Christian Alliance for Indian ChildWelfare and Citi ens Equal Rights Fund., Adoptive Couple v. aby Girl, 570.S. 637 (2013) (No. 12-399).83. Adoptive Couple, 570 .S. at 656 see also ethany erger, n the ame of the
Child, 67 FLA. L. REV. 296, 297-98 (2015) (quoting Adoptive Couple v. aby Girl,570 .S. at 666 n.3).84. Ensurin E ual Protection for ative American Children Challen in the
ndian Child Welfare Act hereinafter Ensurin E ual Protection , GOLDWATERINSTIT TE, https: goldwaterinstitute.org indian-child-welfare-acthttps: perma.cc 4D - E7S . The Goldwater Institute is a libertarian thinktank based in Ari ona. See About the Goldwater nstitute, GOLDWATER INSTIT TE,https: goldwaterinstitute.org about https: perma.cc 22 -3SF .85. See Mary Annette Pember, he ew War on the ndian Child Welfare Act,POLITICAL RESEARCH ASSOCIATES (Nov. 11, 2019),https: www.politicalresearch.org 2019 11 11 new-war-indian-child-welfare-act https: perma.cc YY5 -7Z4R see also Ensurin E ual
Protection, supra note 84.86. See Pember, supra note 85 Ensurin E ual Protection, supra note 84 (listingICWA’s many constitutional problems ).87. See A.D. by Carter v. Washburn, No. CV-15-01259-PH -NVW, 2017 WL1019685 (D. Ari . Mar. 16, 2017), vacated as moot sub. nom. Carter v. Tahsuda,743 Fed. App. 823 (9th Cir. 2018) Gila River Indian Community v. Dep’t of
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more.88 These equal protection claims are part of a much larger strategy toundermine tribal sovereignty.89As part of this ramped up campaign to dismantle ICWA, MatthewMcGill husband of Lori Alvino McGill filed a lawsuit in 2015 on behalf ofthe National Council for Adoption, alleging that the issuance of new ICWAguidelines by the ureau of Indian Affairs ( IA) violated the AdministrativeProcedure Act.90 In 2017, Lori Alvino McGill represented another non-
Child Safety, No. CV-16-0220-PR, 2016 WL 4249676 (Ari . Ct. App. une 13,2017) n re C. . r., 2019 Ohio 1863 (Ohio Ct. App. 10d 2019) S.S. v. StephanieH., 388 P.3d 569 (Ari . Ct. App. 2017), cert. denied sub nom. S.S. v. ColoradoRiver Indian Tribes, 138 S. Ct. 380 (2017) Renteria v. Cuellar, No. 2:16-CV-01685-MCE-AC, 2016 WL 7159233 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2016) In the Matter of.P.C., No. 2 CA-SA 2017-0061 (Ari . Ct. App. 2017) rackeen v. Zinke, 338 F.Supp. 3d 514 (N.D. Tex. 2018), rev d sub nom. rackeen v. ernhardt, 937 F.3d406 (5th Cir. 2019) Fisher v. Cook, No. 2:19-CV-02034, 2019 WL 1787338(W.D. Ark. Apr. 24, 2019).88. See rief Amicus Curiae of Goldwater Institute in Support ofOb ectors Appellants R.P., et. al., In re Alexandria P., 204 Cal. Rptr. 3d 617 (Cal.Ct. App. 2016) (No. 270775) Letter Amicus Curiae 1, Matter of A.P., In reAlexandria P., 204 Cal. Rptr. 3d 617 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016), petition for review
denied 1 Cal. App. 5th 331 (Cal. Sept. 14, 2016) (No. S233216) Letter AmicusCuriae 2, Matter of A.P., In re Alexandria P., 204 Cal. Rptr. 3d 617 (Cal. Ct. App.2016), petition for review denied 1 Cal. App. 5th 331 (Cal. Sept. 14, 2016) (No.S233216) Motion for Leave to File and rief Amicus Curiae of GoldwaterInstitute and the Cato Institute in Support of Petitioners, R.P. and S.P. v. L.A.County Dep’t of Children Family Services, 137 S. Ct. 713 (2017) (No. 16-500) Amicus rief in Support of Discretionary Review, In reWelfare of T.A.W.,383 P.3d 492, 503 (Wash. 2016) (No. 92127-0) rief of the GoldwaterInstitute as Amicus Curiae On Petition for Review, In the Interest of Y. ., AChild, 2019 WL 6904728 (Tex. App. Dec. 19, 2019), petition for review filed,No. 20-0081 (Tex. Mar. 24, 2020) Goldwater Amicus rief, supra note 14.89. See Carole Goldberg, American ndians and Preferential reatment, 48 CLAL. REV. 943, 944-55 (2001) (providing a history of non-Indian groups usingrhetoric of equality and equal rights to attack Indians, Indian tribes, andIndian law).90. SeeNat’l Council for Adoption v. ewell, No. 15-cv-00675, 2015WL 12765872,at 1 (E.D. Va. Dec. 9, 2015), vacated as moot, 2017WL 9440666 (4th Cir. an.30, 2017). The district court upheld the IA guidance. d. see alsoMemorandum in Support of Plaintiff Nat’l Council for Adoption’s Motion forSummary udgment on APA Claim at 14, Nat’l Council for Adoption v. ewell,2015 WL 12765872 (E.D. Va. Dec. 9, 2015) (No. 15-cv-00675) (listingMatthewMcGill among plaintiffs’ counsel).
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Indian couple seeking to adopt an Indian child eligible for enrollment in theChoctaw Nation.91 In 2018, Matthew McGill represented yet another non-Indian couple the rackeens in the case at issue in this Note andcurrently pending in the Fifth Circuit.92The assortment of groups working together to dismantle ICWA bringdiversemotivations to the fight. First, the Christian adoptionmovement is apowerful force. Practicing Christians are more than twice as likely to adoptthan the general population in the nited States.93 For tens of millions ofevangelicals, the movement presents a way to enact anti-abortion idealswhile also evangeli ing the Gospel to the children of the world.94 Theadoption agency involved in the aby Veronica case Nightlight ChristianAdoptions publicly states that adoption fulfills the ible’s GreatCommission to make disciples of all nations. 95 Similarly, the rackeensattend the evangelical Church of Christ twice a week and view adoption asa way to rectify their blessings. 96Colonial ideology is inherent to the Christian adoption movement,implicitly (and often explicitly) assuming that the third world and Indiancommunities are inherently unfit to properly raise their children. Therackeens oppose A.L.M. returning to the custody of her great-aunt andmember of the Nava o Nation, Alvetta ames, not because of concerns aboutabuse or neglect, but rather because of the stereotypes they hold regardinglife in the Nava o Nation. Chad rackeen, who lives in a large brick home onan acre with a pool,97 stated that he worries about A.L.M.,
91. See n re Alexandria P., 204 Cal. Rptr. 3d 617 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016).92. rackeen v. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514 (N.D. Tex. 2018), rev d sub nom.rackeen v. ernhardt, 937 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2019).93. See hin s You eed to Know About Adoption, ARNA (Nov. 4, 2013),https: www.barna.com research 5-things-you-need-to-know-about-adoption https: perma.cc WY8A-RYAT .94. For more on the Christian adoptionmovement, see generally ATHERINE OYCE,THE CHILD CATCHERS: RESC E, TRAFFIC ING, AND THE NEW GOSPEL OF ADOPTION(2013). See also oanne arker, Self Determination, 1 CRIT. ETHNIC ST D. 11(2015) oyce, supra note 50.95. See Pember, supra note 85 (citing Statement of Faith, NIGHTLIGHT CHRISTIANADOPTIONS, https: nightlight.org statement-faith https: perma.cc PFG8-S69 ).96. Hoffman, supra note 2.97. d.
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not as an infant living in a room with a great-aunt but maybe as anadolescent in smaller, confined homes . . . I don’t know what thatlooks like if she needs space, if she needs privacy. I’m a little bitconcerned with the limited financial resources possibly to care forthis child, should an emergency come up.98These are the exact class-based and white cultural ideas of a goodchildhood that the architects of ICWA hoped to protect against.99 ut forNicole Adams of the Colville Confederated Tribes and advisor for thePartnership for Native Children: There is nothing original about some ofthe evangelical Christian adoption movements to focus on Native childrenand take it upon themselves to decide what’s best for Native families. 100Second, the private adoption industry is a lucrative business with aninterest in Indian children.101 Private adoption attorneys routinely chargebetween $10,000 and $40,000 in fees.102 As ethany erger explains, thebusiness model of the adoption industry depends on two things: adoptableinfants and completed adoptions. 103 In order to maximi e profits, theindustry pushed for deregulation, resulting in lax adoption practices thatfail to properly consider the interests of biological parents, children, andadoptive parents.104 Further, as obstacles to international adoption havegrown, prospective adoptive parents predominantly white105 haveturned their attention to Indian children.106 The stringent placementpreference in ICWA, designed to protect Indian communities, make theprocess more burdensome and costly for private adoption agencies. Giventhe economic interests at stake, it is no surprise that the private adoptionindustry turned its full force on ICWA.
98. d.99. SeeH.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, Appendix 1, ICWA Legislative History, at 24 (Nov. 4,1977) (finding that a ll too often, state public and private agencies, indetermining whether or not an Indian family is fit for foster care of adoptiveplacement of an Indian child, apply a white, middle-class standard which, inmany cases, forecloses placement with the Indian family ).100. Pember, supra note 85.101. See erger, supra note 83, at 353-356.102. d.103. d. at 355.104. See id.105. See ARNA, supra note 93.106. See oyce, supra note 50.
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Third, the extractive oil and gas industry has an interest in thedismantling of ICWA. At the heart of this legal battle is the very existence oftribal sovereignty.107 If the Supreme Court declares ICWA unconstitutional,the entire corpus of federal law that governs Indian affairs today 108 couldbe overturned, opening up Indian reservations for extractive exploitation.Reservations hold up to twenty percent of the country’s known oil and gasreserves aswell as thirty percent of the country’s coal reserves.109PresidentTrump’s Native American Affairs Coalition has put forth plans to privati etribal lands to pave a path to deregulated drilling. 110 och Industriesamongst the Goldwater Institute’s ma or donors operatemany businessesinvolved in the petroleum industry, and have already been found by aSenate investigative committee to have stolen at least $31million of oil fromIndian reservations.111 och Industries would profit greatly from thedestruction of tribal sovereignty through the dismantling of ICWA.Fourth, right-wing think-tanks like the Goldwater Institute are usingefforts to dismantle ICWA as an opportune pretext to expand states’ rightsand thereby advance discriminatory policies beyond the reach of the federalgovernment.112 States’ rights have been invoked to oppose racial equality in
See supra Introduction, infra Section II.Litman Fletcher, supra note 29.Mora Grogan et al., ative American Lands and atural Resource Development,REVEN EWATCH INST. 7 (2011), https: resourcegovernance.org sitesdefault files RWI Native American Lands 2011.pdf https:perma.cc 7 G -83TW .Valerie Volcovici, rumpAdvisors Aim to Privati e il Rich ndian Reservations,POLITICO (Dec. 5, 2016), https: www.reuters.com article us-usa-trump-tribes-insight trump-advisors-aim-to-privati e-oil-rich-indian-reservations-id S N13 1 1 https: perma.cc T2VL-WZPE .
See S. REP. NO. 101-216, at 107 (1989) see also Christopher Leonard, How an
il heft nvesti ation Laid the Groundwork for the Koch Playbook, POLITICO( uly 22, 2019), https: www.politico.com maga inestory 2019 07 22 kochland-excerpt-senate-investigation-oil-theft-native-american-tribes-227412 https: perma.cc M7C -F NE .
See, e. ., Lynn Adelman, Launderin Racism hrou h the Court he Scandal of
States Ri hts, DISSENT (Summer 2018), https:www.dissentmaga ine.org article laundering-racism-through-court-scandal-states-rights-federalism https: perma.cc EGE9-42 P States
Ri hts, Civil Ri hts, and the Ri hts of rans ender Americans, HARV.C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (Mar. 6, 2017), https: harvardcrcl.org states-rights-civil-rights-and-the-rights-of-transgender-americans https:perma.cc 5 3-836 .
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public accommodations,113 civil rights,114 the Affordable Care Act,115 theVoting Rights Act,116 and LG T rights.117 The fight against ICWA providesanother vehicle to champion states’ rights by arguing that the lawimproperly commandeers state courts and executive agencies.118 It is nocoincidence thatMatthewMcGill, currently litigating the Brackeen case, alsolitigated the 2018 caseMurphy v. ational Colle iate Athletic Association,119in which the Supreme Court held that the Professional and Amateur SportsProtection Act (PASPA) unconstitutionally commandeered the States.120McGill successfully convinced the Court to strike down federal legislation onthe basis of impermissible commandeering for only the third time in itshistory,121 ultimately laying the groundwork for anti-commandeeringchallenges to ICWA. In fact, when the District Court for theNorthern Districtof Texas declared ICWA unconstitutional in the Brackeen case, it did so onthe basis of the Murphy Standard. 122 If ICWA is overturned oncommandeering grounds, conservative states’ rights advocates will haveeven more ammunition to challenge federal protections of marginali edcommunities.Fifth and finally, right-wing groups have long been invested in whittlingaway at equal protection doctrine. Due to their efforts, the Equal ProtectionClause of the Fourteenth Amendment123 passed in the wake of the CivilWar to protect the rights of formerly enslaved lack people vis- -vis the
113. See, e. ., Civil Rights Cases, 109 .S. 3 (1883).114. See, e. ., eff Nilsson, he Civil Ri hts Act vs. States Ri hts, SAT. EVENING POST( uly 2, 2014), https: www.saturdayeveningpost.com 2014 07 the-civil-rights-act-vs-states-rights https: perma.cc C 9-Y52F .115. See, e. ., Adelman, supra note 112 (citing NFI v. Sebelius, 567 .S. 519(2012)).116. See, e. ., id. (citing Shelby County v. Holder, 570 .S. 529 (2013)).117. See, e. ., Grimm v. Gloucester County School oard, 972 F.3d 586 (4th Cir.2020) see also States Ri hts, Civil Ri hts, and the Ri hts of rans ender
Americans, supra note 112.118. See infra Section III. .119. 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).120. d. at 1481.121. See infra Section III.A.122. rackeen v. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514, 539 (N.D. Tex. 2018), rev d sub nom.rackeen v. ernhardt, 937 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2019).123. .S. CONST. amend. IV, 1.
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States has been narrowed to nearly a nullity.124 For example, in Personnel
Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney,125 the Supreme Court held that inorder to prove discriminatory state action, a plaintiff would have todemonstrate that the government acted because of,’ not merely in spiteof,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group. 126 This intent-basedstandard is so detached from the realities of structural discrimination as tomake it nearly impossible for a plaintiff to prevail.127 Furthermore, whilethe Fourteenth Amendment was passed specifically to rectify the racialsubordination of lack people under a system of white supremacy, courtshave twisted the doctrine to accommodate lawsuits brought by whitepeople claiming that they have been harmed by anti-discriminationpolicies.128 Challenges to ICWA follow a similar pattern, with white couplesseeking to adopt Indian children and claiming that they have been harmedby the law’s burdensome procedural requirements.129 In fact, the GoldwaterInstitute first began to work against ICWA when its former CEO andPresident, Darcy Olsen, learned about the law while training to become afoster parent.130 Challenges to ICWA offer right-wing groups yet anotheropportunity to subvert equal protection doctrine, this time using it touphold the interests of non-Indian people seeking to adopt Indian children.
124. See, e. ., en i Yoshino, he ew E ual Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 755-758 (2011) (surveying the udicial narrowing of the Equal Protection Clauseover time).125. 442 .S. 256 (1979).126. d. at 279 (citation omitted).127. See Yoshino, supra note 124, at 764.128. See, e. ., Fisher v. niversity of Texas at Austin, 570 .S. 297 (2014) (involvinga white student Abigail Fisher claiming she was re ected for admission toniversity of Texas at Austin due to its affirmative action policy).129. See, e. ., Complaint at 25, A.D. by Carter v. Washburn, No. 15-cv-01259-D D,2017WL 1019685 (D. Ari . Mar. 16, 2017), vacatin as moot sub. nom. Carterv. Tahsuda, 743 Fed. App. 823 (9th Cir. 2018) ( ut under ICWA, these familiesare sub ected to procedural and substantive provisions that are based solelyon the race of the children and the adults involved, which lead to severedisruption in their lives contrary to the children’s best interests. ).130. See Rebecca Clarren, A Ri ht Win hink ank s ryin to Brin Down the
ndian Child Welfare Act. Why , NATION (Apr. 6, 2017),https: www.thenation.com article archive a-right-wing-think-tank-is-trying-to-bring-down-the-indian-child-welfare-act-whyhttps: perma.cc 6 SD-3 SR .
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C. he E ual Protection Challen e to CWAThe classic attack on ICWA is that it creates a racial classification,violating the Equal Protection Clause of the .S. Constitution.131 In 2015, theGoldwater Institute filed a suit alleging that c hildren with Indianancestry . . . are still living in the era of Plessy v. Fer uson. 132 The Goldwatertheory is that ICWA’s standards, prioriti ing the placement of Indianchildren with their families, tribes, and broader Indian communities, createan impermissible classification based on race.133 While the Supreme Courtin Adoptive Couple134 declined to review this constitutional issue, it signaledits willingness to engage this issue if the right case arose.135The problem with the Goldwater theory is that it flies in the face offundamental federal Indian law doctrine. Indian tribes are quasi-sovereignentities, with tribal membership functioning as a political status.136 This iswhy the Supreme Court in Morton v. Mancari unanimously upheld aprovision of the Indian Reorgani ation Act that established a hiring
131. .S. CONST. amend. IV, 1. The equal protection doctrine, rooted in the Fifthand Fourteenth Amendments, has evolved into a framework of tieredscrutiny. Yoshino, supra note 124, at 755. The Supreme Court applies strictscrutiny to policies that make classifications on the basis of race, requiringthat such policies serve a compelling government interest and that they benarrowly tailored to achieve such interest. See, e. ., Loving v. Virginia, 388 .S.1, 11 (1967). When the Court decides to apply strict scrutiny to agovernmental policy, it is usually fatal in fact. See Gerald Gunther, he
Supreme Court, erm Foreword n Search of Evolvin Doctrine on a
Chan in Court A Model for a ewer E ual Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8(1972).132. Complaint at 2, A.D. by Carter v.Washburn, No. 2:15-cv-01259-D D, 2017WL1019685 (D. Ari . Mar. 16, 2017), vacated as moot sub. nom. Carter v. Tahsuda,743 Fed. App. 823 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 .S. 537(1896) (upholding the doctrine of separate but equal, ultimately overturnedby rown v. oard of Education, 347 .S. 483, 495 (1954))).133. See Timothy Sandefur, Escapin the CWA Penalty Bo n Defense of E ual
Protection for ndian Children, 37 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. . 1 (2017). Sandefur is theVice President for Litigation at the Goldwater Institute. d.134. Adoptive Couple v. aby Girl, 570 .S. 637 (2013).135. d. at 637 (misleadingly classifying the Native infant involved in the case as1.2 Cherokee, using a biological racial analysis, rather than properly usingICWA’s statutory definition of Indian child, which uses a political analysisrelating to the child’s eligibility for tribal enrollment).136. SeeMorton v. Mancari, 417 .S. 535, 554 (1974).
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preference for Indian employees in the ureau of Indian Affairs.137 TheCourt stated that the hiring preference was not a racial’ preference, 138holding that legislation relating to Indians would be upheld if it wasrationally related to Congress’ unique obligation toward the Indians. 139This understanding of Indian identity is foundational to the corpus offederal Indian law. Supreme Court doctrine consistently recogni es tribesas distinct political entities protected by the federal trust relationship.140Moreover, the Constitution itself singles out Indians in the IndianCommerceClause.141 Asserting that equal protection prohibits the differentialtreatment of Indian tribes would lead to the absurd result of rendering theConstitution unconstitutional. The late professor Philip Frickey describedthe tendency to try to fit federal Indian law into other doctrines as theseduction of coherence. 142 ut seductive as it is, we must not ignore thehistory and realities of Indian tribes for the sake of illusory doctrinalcoherence.In line with settled doctrine viewing Indian tribes as quasi-sovereignpolitical entities, the statutory language of ICWA defines Indian child asany unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) amember of an Indian tribe or (b) eligible for membership in an Indian tribeand is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe. 143 The textexplicitly refers to eligibility for tribal membership, which is defineddifferently from tribe to tribe. ICWA advances tribal self-government,pursuant to the trust relationship, by giving tribes the right to intervene inchild placement proceedings that could result in the removal of theirchildren. Chuck Hoskin r., Principal Chief of the Cherokee Nation, says: A
137. d. see also Indian Reorgani ation Act 12, 25 .S.C. 472 (2018).138. d. at 553 (explaining that the preference was not racial, but rather formembers of federally recogni ed’ tribes ).139. d. at 555.140. See infra note 298 and associated text.141. .S. CONST. art. I, 8, cl. 3.142. Philip P. Frickey, ative American E ceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119HARV. L. REV. 433, 435-36 (2005) see also ethany R. erger, Reconcilin E ual
Protection and Federal ndian Law, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1165, 1166 (2010)(arguing that the seduction of coherence is at its most powerful andproblematic in the equal protection context).143. 25 .S.C. 1903(4) (2018).
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very basic act of sovereignty is the tribe’s ability under law to protect theirchildren. 144While much has been written about equal protection challenges toICWA,145 such challenges have thus far failed to invalidate the law.146 In themost recent case, Brackeen v. Bernhardt,147 the Fifth Circuit’s three- udgepanel re ected an equal protection challenge to ICWA, concluding thatICWA’s definition of Indian child is a political classification 148 andemphasi ing the quasi-sovereign nature of Indian tribes.149 However, it ispossible that the Supreme Court would reverse, especially given the Court’strack record on Indian affairs.150 The addition of three new conservativeustices appointed by President Trump ustice Gorsuch, usticeavanaugh, and ustice arrett is of uncertainmeaning. Gorsuch has often
144. See Roxanna Asgarian, How a White Evan elical Family Could Dismantle
Adoption Protections for ative Children, VO (Feb. 20, 2020),https: www.vox.com identities 2020 2 20 21131387 indian-child-welfare-act-court-case-foster-care https: perma.cc L8N-LT9F .145. See, e. ., Sarah rakoff, heyWereHere First American ndian ribes, Race, and
the Constitutional Minimum, 69 STAN. L. REV. 491 (2017) Allison rause Elder,
ndian as a Political Classification Readin the ribe Back into the ndian
ChildWelfare Act, 13 NW. . L. SOC. POL’Y417 (2018) Gregory Ablavsky, With
the ndian ribes Race, Citi enship and the ri inal Constitutional Meanin s,70 STAN. L. REV. 1025 (2018).146. See rackeen v. ernhardt, 937 F.3d 406, 430 (5th Cir. 2019) ( ICWA’sdefinition of Indian child is a political classification that does not violate equalprotection. ) see also, e. ., n re A. ., 663 N.W.2d 625, 635-36 (N.D. 2003)(applying rational basis analysis to ICWA, explaining, The nited StatesSupreme Court has consistently re ected claims that laws that treat Indians asa distinct class violate equal protection. ) n re aby oy L., 103 P.3d 1099,1107 (Okla. 2004) ( T he different treatment of Indians and non-Indiansunder the Act is based on the political status of the parents and children andthe sovereign nature of the tribe. ).147. rackeen v. ernhardt, 937 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2019).148. d. at 428 (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 .S. 535 (1974)).149. d. at 427.150. See, e. ., David H. Getches, Beyond ndian Law he Rehn uist Court s Pursuit of
States Ri hts, Color Blind Justice and Mainstream alues, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267,280-81 (2001) Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Factbound and Splitless he Certiorari
Process as Barrier to Justice for ndian ribes, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 933 (2009).
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been supportive of tribal sovereignty 151 avanaugh has been hostile totribes 152 and arrett has a very limited record on federal Indian lawaltogether.153 Leading advocates for ICWA have called for deeper scrutinyinto the details of arrett’s adoption of two children fromHaiti, which couldinform her perspective on the law.154II. THEANTI-COMMANDEERING CHALLENGE TO ICWA ANDWHY IT FAILSFollowing failed attempts to invalidate ICWA on the basis of equalprotection claims, challengers havemoved on to a strategy centered on anti-commandeering arguments. This Part describes how this rarely invokeddoctrine is being weaponi ed to attack crucial protections for Indianfamilies and rebuts the claim that ICWA commandeers the States.
A. Anti Commandeerin Doctrine and ts LimitsThe allegation that ICWA commandeers the States mounts a seriousconstitutional challenge. The Supreme Court’s anti-commandeering
151. SeeMark oseph Stern,Why Gorsuch Keeps Joinin the Liberals to Affirm ribal
Ri hts, SLATE (May 20, 2019), https: slate.com news-and-politics 2019 05 neil-gorsuch-supreme-court-tribal-rights-sonia-sotomayor.html https: perma.cc F4 -N6 2 .152. See Daniel Perle, Lack of nderstandin of ribes Brett Kavanau h Deemed
nfriendly to ndian Country, CRON ITE NEWS (Sept. 21, 2018),https: www.indian .com News 2018 09 19 lack-of-understanding-of-tribes-brett-ka.asp https: perma.cc F5V -MFGT ( Tribal and legalofficials . . . said his writings as a lawyer and his rulings in environmental andvoting rights cases give them pause. ) Anna V. Smith, Justice Kavanau h s
mpact on ndian Country, HIGH CO NTRY NEWS (Oct. 12, 2018),https: www.hcn.org articles tribal-affairs- ustice-brett-kavanaughs-impact-on-indian-country https: perma.cc 22L-G 9R .153. SeeMemorandum from oel West Williams, Senior Staff Att’y, Native Am. Rts.Fund, to Tribal Leaders and the Nat’l Cong. of Am. Indians Pro ect on theudiciary 1 (Oct. 6, 2020), https: sct.narf.org articlesindian law urispurdence amy coney barrett indian law.pdf ga 2.69893779.2039589800.1605242458-1769127978.1603935973https: perma.cc 9CF- HYL .154. SeeMary Annette Pember, Amy Coney Barrett and the Fate of ative Adoption
Law, INDIAN CO NTRY TODAY (Oct. 12, 2020), https: www.indian .com News2020 10 12 indian-country-today-fate-of-indian-child-welfare-act-up-to-federal-courts https: perma.cc SP7-GCCN .
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doctrine provides that the Federal Government may not compel the statesto enact or administer a federal regulatory program. 155 This doctrineone of the Court’s more popular federalism interventions 156 is rooted inthe Tenth Amendment157 and has evolved to preserve a healthy balance ofpower between the states and the federal government.ut anti-commandeering doctrine is limited. The Court has invokedcommandeering only three times to invalidate federal legislation.158 Thefirst two cases ew York v. nited States and Print v. nited States werewidelywatched, dramatic cases under the Rehnquist Court. ut while manybelieved Chief ustice Rehnquist was on amission to fundamentally reshapefederalism doctrine,159 the so-called federalism revolution turned out tobe a flash in the pan.160 In its wake, commandeering remains a narrowdoctrine.161
B. Why CWA Does ot Commandeer the StatesDespite the limits of anti-commandeering doctrine, two federal udgeshave now found that ICWA impermissibly commandeers the states. In
155. Print v. nited States, 521 .S. 898, 933 (1997) (quoting New York v. nitedStates, 505 .S. 144, 188 (1992)).156. See essica ulman-Po en Heather . Gerken, ncooperative Federalism, 118YALE L. . 1256, 1296 (2009).157. .S. CONST. amend .158. See New York v. nited States, 505 .S. 144 (1992) (invalidating a federalprovision requiring states to either regulate according to a congressionalscheme or take title to the nuclear waste within their boundaries) Print v.nited States, 521 .S. 898 (1997) (invalidating federal provisions requiringlocal chief law enforcement officers to conduct background checks onprospective gun purchasers) Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018)(holding that a federal law prohibiting states from authori ing sportsgambling was impermissible commandeering of state legislatures). This listexcludes ational Lea ue of Cities v. sery, 426 .S. 833 (1976), overruled by
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan ransit Authority, 469 .S. 528 (1985).159. See Erwin Chemerinsky, he Federalism Revolution, 31 N.M. L. REV. 7, 14-15(2006).160. See enerally athleen M. Sullivan, From States Ri hts Blues to Blue States
Ri hts Federalism After the Rehn uist Court, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 799 (2006).161. See id.
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Brackeen v. inke (N.D. Tex.),162 udge O’Connor invalidated Subchapter I ofICWA, which contains urisdictional and procedural rules for state courtsad udicating child placement proceedings involving Indian children,163 aswell as substantive standards on the best interests of Indian children in suchproceedings.164 In a novel move, udge O’Connor held that such provisionswere unconstitutional because they command States to impose federalstandards in state created causes of action. 165In Brackeen v. Bernhardt (5th Cir.), udge Owen did not go so far as toinvalidate all of Subchapter I, but focused instead on sections 1912(d),1912(e), and 1915(e).166 In her view, these provisions which imposeprecautionary measures to ensure that Indian children are not improperlyremoved from their families impermissibly burden the States.In holding that ICWA unconstitutionally commandeers the States,udges O’Connor and Owen overlooked the substantial corpus of anti-commandeering urisprudence on the precise issues at play. They alsomistakenly assumed that ICWA regulates only state agencies, when in fact,the law regulates the full range of public and private entities involved in theprocess of placing Indian children in foster care or adoptive homes. Adeeper dive into anti-commandeering doctrine and the realities of childcustody proceedings under the terms of the statute reveals that there isnothing in ICWA that commandeers the States.1. State Courts Must Enforce Federal LawIt is settled law that state courts must enforce federal law. Thefoundational precedent for this proposition is esta v. Katt,167 which held
162. 338 F. Supp. 3d 514, 539 (N.D. T 2018), rev d sub nom. rackeen v. ernhardt,937 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2019).163. d.164. 25 .S.C. 1911-23 (2018).165. Brackeen, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 539.166. rackeen v. ernhardt, 937 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2019) (Owen, ., concurring inpart and dissenting in part). For further discussion of udge Owen’sarguments, see infra Sections III.C.2-3.167. 330 .S. 386 (1947). See also Anthony . ellia, r., Federal Re ulation of State
Courts, 110 YALE L. . 947, 958 (2010) ( The Supreme Court has long held thatCongressmay require state courts of competent urisdiction to enforce federalcauses of action. The primary authority for this principle is, of course, Testa v.att. )
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that the Supremacy Clause168 requires state courts to enforce federalclaims.169 This principle has woven its way through anti-commandeeringdoctrine for decades.170 In ew York, the Supreme Court acknowledged thatf ederal statutes enforceable in state court do, in a sense, direct stateudges to enforce them, but this sort of federal direction’ of state udges ismandated by the text of the Supremacy Clause. 171Indeed, the Supreme Court has never invoked commandeering toinvalidate congressional directives to state courts. Authoring the ma orityopinion in Print , ustice Scalia distinguished congressional regulation ofstate courts from congressional regulation of the state political branches,noting that the Constitution was originally understood to permitimposition of an obligation on state ud es to enforce federalprescriptions. 172 Scalia goes on to say: It is understandable why courtsshould have been viewed distinctively in this regard unlike legislatures andexecutives, they applied the law of other sovereigns all the time. 173In ational Adoption Council174 and the three- udge panel decision in
Brackeen v. Bernhardt,175 this was the end of the analysis as to state courts.ICWA is fundamentally an exercise of congressional power under theSupremacy Clause requiring state courts to enforce federal law. There isnothing new or suspect in this. In fact, it is mundane.
168. .S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.169. esta, 330 .S. at 394.170. The Supreme Court cites to esta in thirty subsequent cases, most recently in2019. See Testa v. att, 330 .S. 386, Citing References, WESTLAW,https: westlaw.com see also ellia, supra note 167, at 958.171. New York v. .S., 505 .S. 144, 178-79 (1992) see also Felder v. Casey, 487.S. 131 (1988) (noting that the Supremacy Clause imposes on state courts aconstitutional duty to proceed in such manner that all the substantial rightsof the parties under controlling federal law are protected’ (quoting Garrettv. Moore McCormack, Co., 317 .S. 239, 245 (1942))).172. 521 .S. 898, 907 (1997).173. d.174. SeeNat’l Council for Adoption v. ewell, 2015WL12765872 at 7 (E.D. Va. Dec.9, 2015), vacated as moot, 2017 WL 9440666 (4th Cir. 2017) ( Congresspassed the ICWApursuant to congressional authority expressly granted in theConstitution. ust as Congress may pass laws enforceable in state courts,Congress may direct state udges to enforce those laws. ).175. See rackeen v. ernhardt, 937 F.3d 406, 431 (5th Cir. 2019) ( T o the extentprovisions of ICWA . . . require state courts to enforce federal law, theanticommandeering doctrine does not apply. )
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2. Congress May Impose Federal Procedures on State Courtsnsatisfied with the esta doctrine, udge O’Connor invalidatedSubchapter I of ICWA in its entirety because it commands States toimpose federal standards in state created causes of action. 176 ut udgeO’Connor disregarded the fact that ICWA confers federal rights on Indiantribes and creates a federal cause of action. Additionally, anti-commandeering doctrine tells us that Congress may indeed impose federalprocedures on state courts, in both federal and state causes of action.a. Federal Causes of ActionICWA begins with a Congressional declaration of policy characteri ingthe statute as the establishment of minimum Federal standards for theremoval of Indian children from their families and the placement of suchchildren in foster or adoptive homes. 177 These minimum Federalstandards 178 are federal rights conferred on Indian tribes, parents, andcustodians.The language of rights is present throughout the statute. For example,section 1911(c) provides, T he Indian custodian of the child and the Indianchild’s tribe shall have a ri ht to intervene at any point in the proceeding. 179ut federal laws need not use the explicit language of rights to createthem. For example, section 1912(a) requires parties seeking foster careplacement or termination of parental rights regarding Indian children tonotify Indian parents, custodians, and tribes.180 This provision creates afederal right on behalf of said parties to receive said notice.In addition to creating a scheme of federal rights conferred on Indiantribes, parents, and custodians in the context of child welfare, ICWA createsa federal cause of action allowing these parties to seek redress if their rights
176. rackeen v. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514, 539 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (emphasisadded).177. 25 .S.C. 1902 (2018).178. d.179. 25 .S.C. 1911(c) (2018) (emphasis added).180. 25 .S.C. 1912(a) (2018).
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are violated.181 Several federal courts have assumed urisdiction oversection 1914 claims based on federal question urisdiction.182It is settled law that Congress may impose procedural rules on statecourts to vindicate federal rights.183 The Supreme Court has affirmed thisdoctrine in a line of cases regarding the Federal Employer’s Liability Act(FELA) hereinafter FELA Cases , a statute that includes federal rules ofprocedure that govern enforcement of its own claims in state court.184 In
Central ermont Railway v. White,185 the Court held that state courts mustenforce the federal rule placing the burden of proof to disprovecontributory negligence on the defendant in FELA cases.186 In Dice v. Akron,
Canton & Youn stown Railroad,187 the Court held that state courts mustenforce the federal rule allowing a ury, rather than a udge, to resolvecertain factual questions of fraud in FELA cases.188 In Brown v. Western
Railway,189 the Court held that state courts must apply a more flexiblepleading standard to claims arising under FELA.190 The Court also famouslyaffirmed this principle in the context of 42 .S.C. 1983, which creates afederal cause of action for violations of constitutional rights.191 In Felder v.
Casey,192 the Court held that Wisconsin’s notice-of-claim statute was pre-empted by the federal procedure required in claims arising under section1983.193
181. See 25 .S.C. 1914 (2018).182. See, e. ., Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2005) Roman-Nose v. NewMexico Dep’t of Human Servs., 967 F.2d 435 (10th Cir. 1992) Eagle v.Warren,2019 WL 4572790 (D.S.D. Sept. 19, 2019) Parkell v. South Carolina, 687 F.Supp. 2d 576 (F.D.S.C. 2009). But see, e. ., Morrow v. Winslow, 94 F.3d 1386(10th Cir. 1996) (abstaining from ad udicating a section 1914 collateral attackdue to ongoing adoption proceedings in a state court).183. See enerally ellia, supra note 167.184. 45 .S.C. 51 et seq. (1908).185. 238 .S. 507 (1915).186. d. at 512.187. 342 .S. 359 (1952).188. d. at 363-64.189. 338 .S. 294 (1949).190. d. at 296, 299.191. See Felder v. Casey, 487 .S. 131 (1988).192. d.193. d. at 138.
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The rationale for this principle is that federally mandated proceduresare often part and parcel of federally created rights.194 InDice v. Akron, theCourt asserted that to deprive railroad workers of the ury trial rule laid outin FELA would take away a goodly portion of the relief which Congress hasafforded them, concluding that the rule was too substantial a part of therights accorded by the Act to permit it to be denied by a state court.195Similarly, in Brown, the Court stated that s trict local rules of pleadingcannot be used to impose unnecessary burdens upon rights of recoveryauthori ed by federal laws. 196The Court in Felder explicitly linked federal procedural rights to theSupremacy Clause, explaining that enforcement of the notice-of-claimstatute in section 1983 actions brought in state court so interferes with andfrustrates the substantive right Congress created that, under the SupremacyClause, it must yield to the federal interest. 197 Indeed, if states courts wereable to deploy procedural rules to frustrate federal ob ectives enacted byCongress, the Supremacy Clause would be rendered a nullity. As the Courtinsists in Howlett v. Rose,198 t he Supremacy Clause requires more thanthat. 199Related to this rationale is the concern for uniformity. In Brown v.
Western Railway, the Court explained: Should this Court fail to protectfederally created rights from dismissal because of over-exacting localrequirements . . . desirable uniformity in ad udication of federally createdrights could not be achieved. 200 The Felder Court even warned of thepotential for inconsistent application of federal law within an individualstate, holding that a state law that predictably alters the outcome ofsection 1983 claims depending solely on whether they are brought in state
194. Dice v. Akron, 342 .S. 359, 363 (1952) (quoting ailey v. Cent. Vermont Ry.Inc., 319 .S. 350, 354 (1943)).195. d.196. rown v. W. Ry. of Alabama, 338 .S. 294 (1949). The Court went on to hold:Whatever springes the Statemay set for those who are endeavoring to assertrights that the State confers, the assertion of Federal rights, when plainly andreasonablymade, is not to be defeated under the name of local practice. d. at298-99 (quoting Davis v. Wechsler, 263 .S. 22, 24 (1923)).197. See Felder, 487 .S. at 151.198. 496 .S. 356 (1990).199. d. at 383.200. Brown, 338 .S. at 299 (citing rady v. S. Ry. Co., 320 .S. 476, 479 (1943))
accord. Felder, 487 .S. at 153.
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or federal court within the same State is obviously inconsistent with thefederal interest in intrastate uniformity. 201In summary, Congress can impose federal procedural rules on statecourts if such rules are in order to protect the vindication of federal rights.State court procedural rules that unnecessarily burden federal rights arepreempted under the Supremacy Clause. This means, to the extent thatICWA requires federal courts to abide by specific procedures, suchprocedures are part and parcel of the federal rights they are designed toserve.202 Even udge Owen, in her partial dissent, accepted this analysis astomost of the statute’s provisions.203The procedural requirements set forthin ICWA were designed to protect Indian tribes, parents, and custodiansfrom further state abuses. Without these procedural rules, these federalrights would be no rights at all.b. State Causes of Actionudge O’Connor of the District Court for the Northern District of Texaswould ob ect that regardless of whether ICWA creates federal rights, thecommandeering problem is that Congress directs state courts toimplement the ICWA by incorporating federal standards that modify state
created causes of action. 204 This is because child custody proceedings ariseunder state law, against a backdrop of federal rights and regulations.205 Forexample, the rackeens brought their petition to adopt A.L.M. under theapplicable provisions of the Texas Family Code.206 However, the fact thatICWA modifies state causes of action is not in itself unconstitutional. The
201. Felder, 487 .S. at 133.202. Dice v. Akron, 342 .S. 359, 363.203. rackeen v. ernhardt, 937 F.3d 406, 446 (5th Cir. 2019) (Owen, ., concurringin part and dissenting in part) ( States cannot override or ignore those privateactors’ federal rights by failing to give notice to interested or affected partiesor by failing to follow the placement preferences expressed in the ICWA. If aState desires to place an Indian child with an individual or individuals otherthan the child’s birth parents, the Statemust respect the federal rights of thoseupon whom the ICWA confers an interest in the placement of the Indian childor Indian children more generally. ).204. See rackeen v. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514, 539 (N.D. Tex. 2018).205. See LINDA D. ELROD, CHILD C STODY PRACTICE AND PROCED RE 1:1 (updated Feb.2020).206. See TE . FAM. CODE 162.
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robust set of Supreme Court doctrines in this area affirm the power ofCongress to modify state causes of action to promote tribal rights.i. Applying the FELA Cases Felder Doctrine to StateCauses of ActionSuppose we take this ob ection on its face. If we set aside the analysisthat ICWA creates federal rights and a federal cause of action, focusing onlyon the fact that it modifies state causes of action, the underlyingconstitutional principles of the FELA Cases207 and Felder should still apply.In those cases, the Court held that Congress must be able to impose federalrules of procedure in order to vindicate vital federal interests. In the FELACases, the federal interest was properly compensating railroad workersin ured on the ob.208 In Felder, the federal interest was ensuring thevindication of federal civil rights in state courts.209 In both, the Court founda federal interest in promoting the uniformapplication of federal law acrossthe country.210There should be no federal interest more vital than upholding thefederal trust obligation to Indian tribes.211 Congress enacted ICWA as partof this trust obligation. The first line of the statute recogni es the specialrelationship between the nited States and the Indian tribes and theirmembers and the Federal responsibility to Indian people. 212 Congressfurther found:(2) that Congress, through statutes, treaties, and the general courseof dealing with Indian tribes, has assumed the responsibility for theprotection and preservation of Indian tribes and their resources(3) that there is no resource that is more vital to the continuedexistence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children and thatthe nited States has a direct interest, as trustee, in protecting
207. See Dice v. Akron, 342 .S. 359 (1952) rown v. W. Ry., 338 .S. 294 (1949)Cent. Vermont Ry. v. White, 238 .S. 507, 512 (1915).208. See, e. ., Dice, 342 .S. at 362.209. See Felder, 487 .S. at 139.210. See, e. ., Dice, 342 .S. at 361-62 Felder, 487 .S. at 133.211. For a discussion of the federal trust obligation, see infra Section III.A.212. 25 .S.C. 1901 (2018).
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Indian childrenwho aremembers of or are eligible formembershipin an Indian tribe.213Given the vital interest of the federal government in promoting the self-determination of Indian tribes, Congress should be able to impose federalprocedures on state courts in order to vindicate this interest. If this werenot the case, state courts the very courts whose hostility to the rights ofIndian tribes precipitated ICWA would be able to use local procedures tointerfer e with and frustrat e 214 efforts by Congress to honor its trustobligation. Two centuries of federal Indian law demand more than that.Principles of federalism caution that this doctrine should be appliednarrowly. Congress should only be permitted to impose federal procedureson state courts to uphold federal rights, federal causes of action, and vitalfederal interests. This Note identifies upholding the federal trust obligationas one such vital federal interest. There is no need to expand here on whichother federal interests might be included.215ii. The Jinks DoctrineIn the alternative, the Supreme Court produced a doctrine that, undercertain circumstances, permits Congress to modify state causes of action.ICWA falls neatly into these circumstances.The classic case laying out the contours of Congress’ power to imposefederal procedural requirements on state causes of action is Jinks v. Richland
County.216 The case upheld the constitutionality of 28 .S.C. 1367(d), afederal provision pre-empting state court procedural rules in state causesof action.217 In its analysis, the Jinks Court provided two rationales forCongressional authority to impose federal procedures on state causes ofaction. First, the Court invoked the Necessary and Proper Clause,218 noting
213. d. at 1901(2)-(3).214. Felder, 487 .S. at 151.215. It is worth addressing the possibility that vital federal interests should beassumed in the areas where Congress has plenary power, including federalIndian law, the law of the .S. territories, and immigration law. For adiscussion of plenary power in these areas, see generally Susan ibler Cout net al., Routine E ceptionality he Plenary Power Doctrine, mmi rants, and the
ndi enous nder .S. Law, 4 .C. IRVINE L. REV. 97 (2014).216. 538 .S. 456 (2003).217. See id. at 465.218. .S. CONST. art. 1, 8, cl. 18.
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that section 1367(d) was necessary for Congress to ensure that the lowercourts fairly and efficiently exercise t he udicial Power of the nitedStates. 219 The Court noted that the appropriate test for necessity iswhether a statute is conducive to the due administration of ustice’ infederal court and plainly adapted’ to that end. 220 Second, the Courtproblemati ed a bright-line distinction between procedure andsubstance, concluding, for purposes of the case, that the state-lawprocedure in question was more substantive than procedural.221In line with the first rationale in Jinks, the state proceduralrequirements outlined in ICWA are conducive to the due administration ofustice in federal courts and plainly adapted to that end. While ICWAcases are not exclusively federal, the procedural requirements on both stateand federal courts are necessary to protect the substantive rights of Indians.If these requirements did not exist, the statute would consist instead ofgeneral federal rights thatmight (ormight not) be vindicated in state courts.In light of the very state abuses that prompted the enactment of ICWA, it islikely that the myriad state court proceedings involving Indian childrenwould then be sub ect to section 1914 enforcement actions, which can bead udicated in federal court.222 It would be inefficient to overwhelm thefederal courts with a flood of section 1914 claims when the federal rightscreated in ICWA could ust as easily be vindicated earlier in the process bymodifying state court procedural rules.In line with the second rationale in Jinks, the federal standards thatICWA imposes on state courts in child custody proceedings involving Indianchildren are more substantive than procedural. These standards are thesafeguards that Congress put in place to protect the federal rights of Indiansto raise their children without unduly removals by state and private childwelfare agencies. The Jinks Court expressed doubt that a principleddichotomy can be drawn between substance and procedure.223 In thecontext of ICWA, the dichotomy does not exist.
219. Jinks, 538 .S. at 462 (citations omitted). To support this analysis, the Courtcited to Stewart v. Kahn, which upheld a federal statute that tolled limitationsperiods for state cases during the Civil War. d. at 461-62 (citing Stewart v.ahn, 78 .S. 493 (1871)). In Stewart, the provision was also deemednecessary and proper for the fair and efficient administration of ustice. 78.S. at 506-07.220. d. (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 417, 421 (1819)).221. Jinks, 538 .S. at 464-65.222. See supra Section II. .2.a.223. Jinks, 538 .S. at 464-65 (2003).
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Jinks is Supreme Court precedent. Further, the Fifth Circuit favorablysummari ed the holding of Jinks in 2004.224 It is curious that the .S. DistrictCourt for the Northern District of Texas, in holding ICWA unconstitutional,failed to mention it.iii. Conflict PreemptionThe Supreme Court also applies conflict preemption225 in certainspheres to uphold federal laws that modify state causes of action. For ourpurposes, the Court has held that federal law may modify the reliefavailable under state law causes of action specifically in the area of familylaw.226 For example, in His uierdo v. His uierdo,227 the Court held that thefederal Railroad Retirement Act preempted California community propertyrights in the event of divorce because the California law did ma or damageto clear and substantial federal interests.228 Similarly, in McCarty v.
224. See Arbaugh v. Y H Corp., 380 F.3d 219, 223 n.3 (5th Cir. 2004).225. nder certain circumstances,when a federal law impliedly conflicts with statelaw, it can preempt the state law. Impossibility preemption occurs wherecompliance with both federal and state regulations is a physicalimpossibility. Florida Lime Avocado Growers, Inc., v. Paul, 373 .S. 132,142-43 (1963). Obstacle preemption occurs where state law stands as anobstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes andob ectives of Congress. Hines v. Davidowit , 312 .S. 52, 67 (1941) see alsoGade v. National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 .S. 88, 108 (1992) PLIVA,Inc. v. Mensing, 564 .S. 604 (2011).226. rief of Admin. Law and Constitutional Law Scholars as Amici Curiae inSupport of Defendants-Appellants at 7, rackeen v. ernhardt, 937 F.3d 406(5th Cir. 2019) (No. 18-11479). More generally:F ederal statutes governing income tax, pensions, and bankruptcysignificantly affect divorce practice. Supreme Court decisions havealtered many of the ground rules for adoption and inheritance whennon-marital children are involved. Many of the most complexproblems addressed in family law courses concern the intersection offederal and state statutes governing such matters as child supportand child custody urisdiction.
d. (citing Ann Laquer Estin, Federalism and Child Support, 5 VA. . SOC. POL’YL. 541, 541 (1998)).227. 439 .S. 572 (1975).228. d. at 581 (quoting nited States v. Ya ell, 382 .S. 341, 352 (1966)).
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McCarty,229 the Court held that a federal military retirement schemepreempted California property rights in the event of divorce because theconsequences sufficiently in ure the ob ectives of the federal program. 230Congress enacted ICWA in order to promote its clear and substantial federalinterest in protecting Indian tribes. The state laws that conflict with ICWA’sprocedural requirements sufficiently in ure the ob ectives of the federalprogram and are pre-empted.2313. Congress May Impose Record- eeping Requirements on theStatesIn her partial dissent, udge Owen further argued that ICWA’s record-keeping requirement improperly applies only to states, rather thanevenhandedly to private actors and states.232 Section 1915(e)233 of ICWArequires the States to maintain records of adoptive placements of Indianchildren, including evidence of the efforts made to comply with the ICWAplacement preference.234 udge Owen acknowledged that the SupremeCourt expressly distinguished impermissible commandeering from record-keeping laws which require only the provision of information to theFederal government. 235However, she asserted that ICWA’s record-keepingrequirement is different because it is the whole ob ect of the law to directthe functioning of the state executive, and hence to compromise thestructural framework of dual sovereignty. 236The Supreme Court has never invalidated a federal statute on the basisof mere reporting requirements imposed on the States. In Print , usticeScalia noted that federal laws requiring only the provision of informationto the Federal Government do not involve the forced participation of the
229. 453 .S. 210 (1981).230. d. at 221 (quoting His uierdo, 439 .S. at 583).231. d.232. rackeen v. ernhardt, 937 F.3d 406, 445 (5th Cir. 2019) (Owen, ., concurringin part and dissenting in part).233. 25 .S.C.A. 1915(e).234. d.235. Brackeen, 937 F.3d at 444-45 (quoting Print v. nited States, 521 .S. 898,918 (1997)).236. d. at 445 (quoting Print , 521 .S. at 932).
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States’ executive in the actual administration of a federal program, 237 andin concurrence, ustice O’Connor similarly distinguished purelyministerialreporting requirements from the provisions invalidated in that case.238Furthermore, in F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi,239 the Court upheld a far moreintrusive command to the States, holding that Congress can imposemandatory consideration of federal standards on the States, includingmandatory reporting procedures for such considerations.240ICWA’s record-keeping requirement like the many other federalprovisions requiring states to keep records241 falls squarely within thebounds of this doctrine. In fact, it is less intrusive than the requirementupheld in F.E.R.C., where the statute in question required state agencies toreport extensive records to the Secretaryof Energy every ten years.242 ICWArequires only that states maintain records of where Indian children areplaced and the efforts taken to comply with the statute’s placementpreference, and to produce such records if requested by the Secretary ofInterior or the child’s tribe.243As a practical matter, the record-keeping requirements in ICWA alignwith existing requirements in the federal Adoption and Foster Care Analysisand Reporting System (AFCARS).244 AFCARS part of the federally fundedchild welfare scheme under Title IV-E of the Social Security Act245 has
237. Print , 521 .S. at 917-18.238. d. at 936 (O’Connor, ., concurring).239. 456 .S. 742 (1982).240. d. at 761-70. In this case, the Court also held that Congress can compel stateadministrative tribunals to hear cases arising under a federal statute,provided that such ad udications are the very type of activity customarilyengaged in by the state agency. d. at 760.241. See, e. ., 15 .S.C. 2224 (2018) (requiring States to submit to FEMA andperiodically update a list of covered public accommodations) 20 .S.C. 4013(2018) (requiring States to maintain records regarding the presence ofasbestos in school buildings and to annually submit a list of candidates forasbestos abatement activities) 34 .S.C. 41307 (2018) (requiring State lawenforcement agencies to report missing children to the DO ) 42 .S.C.11133(b) (2018) (requiring State medical examination boards to reportcertain information to the federal government).242. F.E.R.C., 456 .S. at 749.243. 25 .S.C. 1915(e) (2018).244. See 45 C.F.R. 1335 et se . (2016).245. 42 .S.C. 670-79 (2018).
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been adopted by every state in the country.246 It includes an extensive listof state record-keeping requirements and directs the States to producereports twice a year.247 AFCARS already requires states to report thedemographic information of any child adopted or placed in foster care,including whether the child is American Indian or Alaska Native. 248 It alsoalready requires states to report case plan goals for every child placed infoster care.249 y comparison, the only additional record ICWA requires isevidence that the childwelfare agency attempted to complywith the ICWA’splacement preference.250 In light of the existing AFCARS reportingrequirements, the additional requirement imposed by ICWA is, at most, anextra sentence.One might ob ect that unlike ICWA, AFCARS is a federally fundedprogram authori ed under the Tax and Spend Clause.251 Technically, a statewould be free to re ect federal funding and organi e its own child welfaresystem. ut in reality, no state could feasibly re ect Title IV-E funding. TheStates depend on the federal government for the daily workings of theirchild welfare programs in 2016, the federal government spent $7.5 billionin Title IV-E funds, representing fifty-five percent of funds spent by statechild welfare agencies that year.252 In Texas, the rackeen family’s state ofresidence, federal funding constituted forty-seven percent of child welfarefunding in 2016, including nearly $320 million in Title IV-E funds.253Consequently, in practice, the AFCARS requirements are mandatory.
246. See Child Welfare Financin , NAT. CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLAT RES (May 30,2019), https: www.ncsl.org research human-services child-welfare-financing-101.aspx https: perma.cc A3Y -RZ7L .247. 45 C.F.R. 1355.40 (2020).248. 45 C.F.R. 1355 app. A (2020) 45 C.F.R. 1355 app. (2020).249. 45 C.F.R. 1355 app. A. (2020).250. 25 .S.C. 1915(e) (2018).251. .S. CONST. art. 1, 8, cl. 1.252. itle E Spendin by Child Welfare A encies, CHILD TRENDS (2018),https: www.childtrends.org wp-content uploads 2018 12TitleIVESFY2016 ChildTrends December2018.pdfhttps: perma.cc VC8 -E4CR .253. Child Welfare Financin Survey SFY , CHILD TRENDS,https: www.childtrends.org research research-by-topic child-welfare-financing-survey-sfy-2016 https: perma.cc L5N-HV8R (percentagecalculated by author.)
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To be clear, even if ICWA did impose extensive reporting requirements,such provisions would be constitutional.254 Even udge Owen cannot offerconcrete precedent or textual evidence invalidating such requirements,relying instead on the principles set forth in Print , which she does notdefine.255 Her approach, focusing specifically on the ob ect of section1915(e) as opposed to the statute as awhole, actually departs from Print 256and would ultimately nullify all federal statutes with record-keepingrequirements. Moreover, w ith respect, directing state executives is notthe whole ob ect’ of ICWA. 257 The ob ect is to protect Indian children andtribal sovereignty.4. ICWA Even-Handedly Regulates States and Private PartiesIn her partial dissent, udge Owen asserted that sections 1912(d) and(e) run afoul of the requirement that federal regulations even-handedlyapply to states and private parties.258 Section 1912(d) of ICWAprovides thatany party seeking to effect a foster care placement of, or termination ofparental rights to, an Indian child must make active efforts to provideremedial services to prevent the breakup of the Indian family. 259 Section1912(e) provides that foster care placements for Indian children can onlybe made after a qualified expert witness testifies that continued custodyby the Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physicaldamage to the child. 260 udge Owen concluded that while sections 1912(d)and (e) are superficially applicable to states and private entities alike, they
254. See supra notes 237-240 and accompanying text.255. rackeen v. ernhardt, 937 F.3d 406, 445 (5th Cir. 2019) (Owen, ., concurringin part and dissenting in part (quoting Print v. nited States, 521 .S. 898,918 (1997))).256. See Print , 521 .S. at 932 (considering the ob ect of the rady Act as a whole,rather than the ob ect of the specific provisions requiring state chief lawenforcement offices to conduct background checks).257. Supplemental En anc rief of Appellants Cherokee Nation, Oneida Nation,uinault Indian Nation, Morongo and of Mission Indians at 45, rackeen v.ernhardt, 937 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2019).258. Brackeen, 937 F.3d at 443 (Owen, . concurring in part and dissenting in part).259. 25 .S.C. 1912(d) (2018).260. 25 .S.C. 1912(e) (2018).
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apply only to the States in practice because f oster care placement is notundertaken by private individuals or private actors. 261This is incorrect. ICWA regulates the universe of entities that participatein the removal of Indian children from their biological parents, includingboth states and private entities. The statutory language is clear on this point.Sections 1912(d) and (e) refer explicitly to a ny party seeking to effect afoster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indianchild. The statute also defines foster care placement to include any actionplacing an Indian child in the home of a guardian or conservator 262typically private actions.263A plethora of private entities are sub ect to ICWA’s regulatory scheme.Most tellingly, the only two Supreme Court cases addressing custodydisputes under ICWA Adoptive Couple and Mississippi Band of Choctaw
ndians applied ICWA’s requirements in the context of privateadoption.264 Additionally, in a case litigated by the Goldwater Institute, theSupreme Court of Washington found that ICWA’s active efforts provisionsapply to both state and privately initiated parental terminations.265
261. Brackeen, 937 F.3d at 443-44 (Owen, ., concurring in part and dissenting inpart).262. 24 .S.C. 1903(1)(i) (2018).263. See CherokeeNation Supplemental rief, supra note 257, at 43 (citing, e.g., .W.v. R. ., 951 P.2d 1206, 1212-13 (Alaska 1998)) Empson-Laviolette v. Crago,760N.W.2d 793, 799 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) n re Custody of A. .H., 502N.W.2d790, 793 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) n re Guardianship of .C.D., 686 N.W.2d 647,649 (S.D. 2004)) see also Guardianship of Ashley Eli abeth R., 863 P.2d 451,453 (N.M. Ct. App.) n re Custody of S. .R., 719 P.2d 154, 155-56 (Wash. Ct.App. 1986).264. See Adoptive Couple v. aby Girl, 570 .S. 637, 644 (2013) Miss. and ofChoctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 .S. 30, 39 (1989).265. See n re T.A.W., 383 P.3d 492, 503 (Wash. 2016) see also S.S. v. Stephanie H.,241 Ari . 419, 423-24 (Ari . Ct. App. 2017) (holding that ICWA applies to aprivate termination of parental rights proceeding also litigated byGoldwater) see also, e. ., D v. P.C., 36 P.3d 663, 671 (Alaska 2001) (applyingICWA to a private adoption proceeding brought by an Indian guardian(grandmother) seeking termination of parental rights of an Indian biologicalparent) Matter of Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage, 111 N. . 155 (N. .1988) (applying ICWA to a privately initiated termination of parental rightsby an Indian biological parent) n re Adoption of Micah H., 295Neb. 213 (Neb.2016) (applying ICWA to a private adoption proceeding brought by an Indianguardian (grandparents) seeking termination of parental rights of an Indian
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Similarly, the Supreme Court of Nebraska recently held that ICWA appliedin a private guardianship proceeding where a child’s grandmother broughtan action against the child’s mother petitioning for temporaryguardianship.266 In order to properly assume guardianship, thegrandmother not the state was first required to use active efforts toprevent the breakup of the Indian parent and child.267Private adoption agencies across the country endeavor to meet theirregulatory requirements under ICWA, including American Adoptions, oneof the largest private adoption agencies in the nited States.268 AmericanAdoptions, which operates several offices in the rackeens’ home state ofTexas,269 provides ICWA guidance to prospective caregivers and adoptiveparents,270 screens biological parents and prospective adoptive parents forIndian heritage to verify ICWA eligibility,271 and asserts that their socialwork staff receive ICWA training from . . . one of the country’s foremostIndian Child Welfare experts. 272Many private adoption agencies are also required to understand andcomply with ICWA as a condition of state licensing.273 In Texas the home
biological parent) A. .M. v. M.H., 651 P.2d 1172, 1172-74 (Alaska 1982)(applying ICWA to a privately initiated termination of parental rights by anIndian biological parent) ruce L. v. W.E., 247 P.3d 966, 976 (Alaska 2011)(applying ICWA to a privately initiated termination of parental rights by anIndian parent).266. See n re Guardianship of Eli a W., 938 N.W. 2d 207 (Neb. 2020).267. d. at 1006-07.268. See he ndian Child Welfare Act CWA and Adoption, AM. ADOPTIONS,https: www.americanadoptions.com state adoption indian child welfareact https: perma.cc 8P8T-V8VP .269. See e as Adoption nformation and Resources, AM. ADOPTIONS,https: www.americanadoptions.com texas-adoption https: perma.cc8 MP-ATD7 (listing six Texas offices).270. See he ndian Child Welfare Act CWA and Adoption, supra note 268.271. See Free Adoption nformation, AM. ADOPTIONS,https: www.americanadoptions.com pregnant free info https: perma.ccG58-75Z .272. See he ndian Child Welfare Act CWA and Adoption, supra note 268.273. See, e. ., Community Based Care Authority and Re uirements Reference Guide,FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN FAMILIES (2016), https: myflfamilies.com service-programs community-based-care docs C C 20Authority 20and20Requirements 20Reference 20Guide.PDF https: perma.cc 5RG-
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state of the rackeens private adoption and foster care agencies, knownas Child Placement Agencies, play an outsi ed role in child custodyproceedings. There are 150 licensed private Child Placement Agenciesoperating in Texas,274 and the Texas Department of Family and ProtectiveServices asserts that most foster care services are currently provided bythe private sector. 275 With few exceptions, all private entities seeking toprovide child placement services in Texas must operate under a designatedAdministrator’s license.276 The licensure process requires prospectiveAdministrators to pass an exam that covers a set of minimum standards,277including compliance with all state and federal laws regarding terminationof parental rights. 278 Therefore, the Child Placement Agency Administrator
ML R (requiring private providers to be knowledgeable of and fully complywith all state and federal laws, rules, and regulations relating to ICWA) Child
Welfare Case Mana ement Provider Roles and Responsibilities, AN. DEP’T OFCHILDREN FAMILIES, http: content.dcf.ks.gov ppsrobohelp ppmgenerate pps policies 5000 child welfare casemanagement 5212 child welfare case management provider roles andresponsibilities.htm https: perma.cc G6T-GFA5 (requiring privateproviders to work with tribes to . . . ensure compliance with the Indian ChildWelfare Act. ).274. See Active and pen Contracts, TE . DEP’T OF FAMILY PROTECTIVE SERVS.,https: www.dfps.state.tx.us Doing usiness Purchased Client ServicesResidential Child Care Contracts active contracts.asp https: perma.ccH2 A- L 6 .275. Community Based Care FA s, TE . DEP’T OF FAMILY PROTECTIVE SERVS.,https: www.dfps.state.tx.us Child Protection Foster Care Community-ased Care FA .asp cbc https: perma.cc 2 R6-R8TE . Texas is well on itsway toward complete privati ation of the child welfare system. See aty Vine,
As e as Privati es Child Protective Services, Will the Horror Go nheard , TE .MONTHLY (Mar. 6, 2019), https: www.texasmonthly.com news texas-privati es-child-protective-services-will-horror-stories-go-unheardhttps: perma.cc D6SW- GGH (discussing the recently passed TexasSenate ill 11, which vastly privati ed Texas’s child welfare system).276. See 26 TE . ADMIN. CODE 745.37 (2020).277. See Licensed Child Care or Licensed Child Placin Administrator, TE . DEP’T OFHEALTH H MAN SERVS., https: hhs.texas.gov doing-business-hhs provider-portals protective-services-providers child-care-licensing licensed-child-care-or-licensed-child-placing-administrator https: perma.cc Y5CE-5 49 .278. Tex. Health Human Servs. Commission, Minimum Standards for Child
Placin A encies . , TE . DEP’T OF HEALTH H MAN SERVS. (2018),
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overseeing Nightlight Christian Adoptions279 the rackeens’ adoptionagency would have been required to understand the relevant federal andstate standards in order to obtain a license.The Supreme Court has consistently held that congressional regulationthat applies even-handedly to both states and private entities isconstitutional. In the case most analogous to the context of ICWA, Reno v.
Condon,280 the Court held that the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA),restricting the disclosure of drivers’ personal information, did notcommandeer the States.281 The plaintiff, South Carolina, argued that theDPPA violated the Tenth Amendment because it regulate d the Statesexclusively, 282 contending that states were the sole holders of drivers’personal information. The Court flatly re ected this argument, stating thatthe DPPA regulates the universe of entities that participate as suppliers tothe market for motor vehicle information including the States and privateentities.283 In its reasoning, the Court looked to the statutory language of theDPPA, noting the many provisions that explicitly regulate privatepersons. 284 The Court also relied on congressional factual findings thatmany states sell personal information obtained by Departments of MotorVehicles to private entities.285Once the Court finds that a congressional enactment generally appliesto both states and private individuals, it is willing to uphold even the mostonerous compliance requirements. In Condon, the Court upheld the DPPAeven in the face of South Carolina’s contention that it would require theState’s employees to learn and apply the Act’s substantive restrictions . . .which would consume the employees’ time and thus the States’
https: hhs.texas.gov sites default files documents doing-business-with-hhs provider-portal protective-services ccl min-standards chapter-749-cpa.pdf https: perma.cc 37W6-MS 2 .279. See Tex. Dep’t of Family Protective Servs., Child Placin A ency
Administrators for Re ion , TE . DEP’T OF HEALTH H MAN SERVS.,https: www.dfps.state.tx.us Child Care Licensed AdministratorsAdministrators Results.asp r 7 admtype LCPA https: perma.cc P7 -4 .280. 528 .S. 141 (2000).281. d. at 151.282. d.283. d.284. d. at 146-47.285. See id. at 143.
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resources. 286 Similarly, in South Carolina v. Baker,287 the Court upheld afederal financial regulatory scheme even though many state legislatureshad to amend a substantial number of statutes and state officials had todevote substantial effort in order to comply.288 Responding to a complaintby the National Governor’s Association, the Court firmly countered: Suchcommandeering’ is . . . an inevitable consequence of regulating a stateactivity. Any federal regulation demands compliance. 289III. THEDANGERS OF THEANTI-COMMANDEERING ARG MENT TO TRI ALSOVEREIGNTYHaving established that ICWA does not commandeer the States, thisNote now turns to the broader implications of the anti-commandeeringargument for tribal sovereignty. The stakes to Indian children and familiesare clear without federal protections in place to prevent abuses by statechild welfare agencies and private adoption entities, Indian communitiesare at risk of a renewed crisis of child removals from their families andtribes. This form of forced assimilation and cultural genocide, on its own,strikes at the heart of tribal sovereignty.290Additionally, as discussed above,if ICWA is overturned on the basis of equal protection, the ruling wouldthreaten the status of Indian tribes as quasi-sovereign political entities.291However, the anti-commandeering argument also poses an additionalinsidious threat to tribal sovereignty by endangering many of the existingfederal policies designed to protect the tribes from state encroachment.This Section elaborates on how the federal government imposesrequirements and restrictions on states with regards to their relationshipswith tribes and explores how the anti-commandeering argument coulddisrupt the balance among the three sovereigns: the States, the tribes, andthe federal government.
d. at 149.485 .S. 505 (1988).
d. at 514-15.
d.For a discussion of the practice of removing Indian children from theirfamilies by state child welfare agencies as cultural genocide, see MaineWabanaki-State ChildWelfare Truth Reconciliation Commission, supra note73, at 64-65.
See supra Section II.
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A. he rust Doctrine as a Defense to State EncroachmentSince the founding of the nited States, state governments havepersistently and aggressively sought to extend their laws and urisdictionover Indian country.292 Indeed, state encroachment gave rise to one of thefoundational cases of federal Indian law, Cherokee ation v. Geor ia.293 Inthat case, the State of Georgia sought to forcibly remove the Creek andCherokee Indians from the western portion of the state, particularly uponthe discovery of gold on the Indians’ land, going so far as to threaten civilwar if the federal government blocked its efforts.294 As part of this standoff,Georgia enacted a series of laws to extend state urisdiction over Indianterritory, annul Cherokee laws, and direct the sei ure of all Cherokeelands.295 Cherokee ation arrived on the doorstep of the Supreme Courtwhen the State of Georgia actually prosecuted and convicted a CherokeeIndian named George Tassel, who ordinarily would have been sub ect to theurisdiction of the Cherokee Nation.296 While the Supreme Court dismissedthe case, Chief usticeMarshall’s opinion laid the groundwork for the federaltrust obligation to Indian tribes, characteri ing them as domesticdependent nations requiring federal protection.297The trust doctrine is foundational to federal Indian law. Rooted in theMarshall Trilogy 298 a series of federal Indian law cases, including
Cherokee ation, decided in the early 1800s it sets up the relationship ofIndian tribes to the nited States as that of a ward to his guardian. 299Overthe past two centuries, the doctrine developed to impose an exacting
292. For an extensive treatment of this history, see Clifford M. Lyttle, he Supreme
Court, ribal Soverei nty, and Continuin Problems of State Encroachment into
ndian Country, 8 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 65 (1980).293. 30 .S. 1 (1831).294. See Lyttle, supra note 292, at 67.295. d.296. d.297. d see also Cherokee ation, 30 .S. at 16. For an overview of the trustdoctrine, see evin . Washburn, What the Future Holds he Chan in
Landscape of Federal ndian Policy, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 200 (2017) ReidPeyton Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal rust Responsibility to
ndians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213 (1975).298. SeeWorcester v. Georgia, 31 .S. 515 (1832) Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30.S. 1 (1831) ohnson v. M’Intosh, 21 .S. 543 (1823).299. Cherokee ation, 30 .S. at 1.
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fiduciary duty on the part of the federal government to protect tribal treatyrights, funds, and natural resources,300 as well as a duty to promote tribalself-governance and economic development.301 The trust obligation alsogave rise to clear statement rules when Congress acts against the interestof Native nations, forcing political accountability for colonial action, andcanons of interpretation that recogni e the imbalance of power and thatread agreements in favor of Native nations. 302The anti-commandeering challenge to ICWA threatens to constrain thefederal government’s ability to uphold its trust obligation to Indian tribes.In order to fully protect the self-determination and economic prosperity oftribes, the federal government must be able to guard against state threatsto tribal sovereignty. Indeed, recent Supreme Court decisions reflect theCourt’swillingness to sidewith tribes over states in cases involving the trustresponsibility. In McGirt v. klahoma,303 a recent case involving aurisdictional dispute between the Muskogee (Creek) Nation and the Stateof Oklahoma, the Supreme Court sidedwith tribes finding that the State ofOklahoma lacked criminal urisdiction over an Indian defendant and overtheMuskogee (Creek) Reservation.304While the central question before theCourt focused on whether Congress had abrogated the Muskogee (Creek)Nation’s 1833 reservation borders, the Court’s underlying task was tobalance state sovereignty against the federal government’s trust obligationto honor past treaties.The Court’s decision also hinted at a potentially favorable outcome fortribes if Brackeen were to be reviewed by the Court. The Court in McGirt
300. See, e. ., Seminole Nation v. nited States, 316 .S. 286, 296-97 (1942)( nder a humane and self-imposed policy which has found expression inmany acts of Congress and numerous decisions of this Court, it has chargeditself with moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust. Itsconduct, as disclosed in the acts of those who represent it in dealings with theIndians, should therefore be udged by the most exacting fiduciarystandards. ).301. See, e. ., California v. Caba on and of Mission Indians, 480 .S. 202, 216(1987) ( The inquiry is to proceed in light of traditional notions of Indiansovereignty and the congressional goal of Indian self-government, includingits overriding goal of encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economicdevelopment. ) (internal quotation and citation omitted).302. Maggie lackhawk, Federal ndian Law as a Paradi m Within Public Law, 132HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1825 (2019).303. 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020).304. d.
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contemplated the potential impact of their decision over civil disputes andon Indian child welfare in particular, as it was raised in the amicus briefs305and in oral argument.306 The decision in favor of tribes inMcGirt serves as alegal basis to challenge past adoptions and custody disputes involvingIndian children residing or domiciled within Muskogee reservations.307 Italso lays a foundation for the Muscogee (Creek) Nation to assume originalurisdiction over future child custody disputes within their now-recogni edreservation boundary, as state courts are not free to exercise urisdictionover civil suits in actions involving Indians in Indian reservations.308Despite the potential disruptions to states such as Oklahoma, the Courtnonetheless ruled in favor of tribes, signaling a commitment to the trustobligation in custodydisputes aswell. Perhapsmost importantly, it affirmedthe Court’s interest in upholding the balance of power among the states,federal government, and tribes.
B. Federal Schemes Governin State ribe RelationshipsAs a central part of its trust obligation, the federal government hasenacted an extensive scheme of laws, regulations, and legal precedentgoverning the States’ relationship with Indian tribes. If ICWA were to beheld unconstitutional on the basis of commandeering, centuries of federallaw would be thrown into question, as well as the viability of the trustobligation itself. While examples of federal requirements and restrictionson the States with regard to their relations with Indian tribes abound, thefollowing examples are illustrative of the types of schemes that might beendangered.
305. rief for the nited States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 40,McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020) (No. 18-9526), 2020WL1478583,at 40.306. Transcript of Oral Argument at 40-41, McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452(2020) (No. 18-9526), 2020 WL 2425717, at 40-41 ( ustice agan askedRiya an i about the consequences, if any, of the decision on adoptions andfoster care proceedings. Mr. an i discussed ICWA at length in his response.).307. rief for the nited States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supranote 305, at 40 (citing 25 .S.C. 1911(a) (2018)).308. SeeWilliams v. Lee, 358 .S. 217 (1959) (finding that state courts are not freeto exercise urisdiction over civil suits arising on Indian reservations and overIndians).
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1. Economic Development Through Indian GamingIn the late 1970s, several Indian tribes began to pursue gamingenterprises, such as casinos and bingo halls, as novel tools for reservationeconomic development.309 State governments immediately attempted torestrict tribal gaming operations, claiming that much of Indian gaming ranafoul of state regulations and would lead to an infiltration of the tribalgames by organi ed crime. 310 In response to state challenges to Indiangaming, the Supreme Court held in California v. Caba on Band of Mission
ndians that unless a state prohibits a specific type of gambling altogether,it cannot regulate that type of gambling on an Indian reservation.311 Incoming to its decision, the Court weighed Congress’ interest in promotingtribal self-determination and self-sufficiency with California’s statedinterest in preventing organi ed crime,312 ultimately concluding thatCalifornia’s interest was insufficient to escape the pre-emptive force offederal and tribal interests apparent in this case. 313Soon after the Caba on case was decided, Congress passed the IndianGaming Regulatory Act (IGRA).314 One of the Act’s stated purposes, in linewith the federal trust obligation, was to promote economic development,tribal self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments. 315 The Act gave
309. See athryn R.L. Rand, here Are o Pe uots on the Plains Assessin the
Success of ndian Gamin , 5 CHAPMAN L. REV. 47 (2002) (citing STEPHEN CORNELLET AL., AMERICAN INDIANGAMING POLICY AND ITS SOCIO-ECONOMICEFFECTS: A REPORTTO THENATIONAL GAM LING IMPACT ST DY COMMISSION 77 (1998)).310. California v. Caba on and of Mission Indians, 480 .S. 202, 220 (1987) see
also Rand, supra note 309, at 48-51.311. Caba on Band of Mission ndians, 480 .S. at 208-12.312. See id. at 216-22.313. d. at 221.314. 25 .S.C. 2701-721 (2018).315. 25 .S.C. 2702. The other stated purposes of IGRA are:(2) to provide a statutory basis for the regulation of gaming by anIndian tribe adequate to shield it from organi ed crime and othercorrupting influences, to ensure that the Indian tribe is the primarybeneficiary of the gaming operation, and to assure that gaming isconducted fairly and honestly by both the operator and players and(3) to declare that the establishment of independent Federalregulatory authority for gaming on Indian lands, the establishment ofFederal standards for gaming on Indian lands, and the establishment
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tribes the exclusive authority to regulate Class I gaming316 and the authorityto regulate Class II gaming sub ect to federal oversight.317 ut the Actrequired tribes to negotiate Tribal-State compacts in order to operate ClassIII, or casino-style, gaming.318 To level the balance between the tribes andthe States, the Act concurrently imposed a duty on the States to negotiatesuch compacts in good faith, creating a cause of action for tribes to sue statesthat declined to do so.319Almost a decade after the passage of IGRA, the Supreme Court held in
Seminole ribe v. Florida320 that State sovereign immunity, unless waived,precluded tribal lawsuits against states that refused to negotiate Tribal-State compacts in good faith.321 However, by that time, many tribes hadalready successfully negotiated contracts under IGRA.322 Indian gaming hasbeen the most successful economic venture ever to occur consistentlyacross a wide range of American Indian reservations. 323 Gaming hasallowed many tribes to strengthen education, medical services, and a widerange of other social services, and allowed them tomarshal the resources tomore effectively advocate in the halls of Congress and the courts.324In addition to the complex urisdictional disputes and regulatorytensions that would arise among states, tribes, and the federal government
of a National Indian Gaming Commission are necessary to meetcongressional concerns regarding gaming and to protect such gamingas a means of generating tribal revenue.
d.316. d. 2710(a)(1). Class I gaming consists of social games and traditional tribalgambling. d. 2703(6).317. d. 2710(b). Class II gaming consists of bingo and non-banking card games.
d. 2703(7).318. d. 2710(d). Class III gaming consists of all forms of gaming that are notclass I gaming or class II gaming, id. 2703(8), including banking card games,electronic facsimiles of games, and slot machines, id. 2703(7)( ).319. d. 2710(d)(7).320. 517 .S. 44 (1996).321. d. at 76.322. See Rand, supra note 309, at 52.323. evin . Washburn, he Le acy of ryan v. Itasca County How an Erroneous
County a otice Helped Brin ribes Billion in ndian Gamin
Revenue, 92 MINN. L. REV. 919, 921 (2008).324. See id. at 922 (citing Rand, supra note 309, at 53-54).
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CO ANDEERING CONFRONTATIONif ICWAwere held unconstitutional, the scale of the economic impact cannotbe understated. As of 2018, Indian Gaming revenues were in excess of $33.7billion dollars, and were found to be increasing with each coming year.325The economic success of Indian gaming is also shared by states, localities,and the federal government. The total annual contribution of Indian gamingto the .S. economy is roughly $103 billion dollars and sustains at least770,000 obs.326 At least twenty-eight states rely on Indian Gamingrevenues.327 A recent state-by-state economic analysis on the impactof tribal gaming found that each year Indian gaming contributes $1.8billion in direct payments to federal, state, and local governments, and$10.5 billion in federal, state, and local taxes.328If ICWA were to be held unconstitutional on the basis ofcommandeering, the ruling might cast doubt on the constitutionality of thecomplex legal scheme that Congress and the Supreme Court have developedto balance state interests, tribal interests, and federal interests in the areaof tribal economic development through gaming. Further, if the federalgovernment were no longer able to restrict states from encroaching onIndian gaming operations, a pro ect that has vastly improved reservationlife for many tribes329 might be endangered. It would also compromise thefinancial relationship among states, tribes, and the federal government, andupend entire communities that rely on Indian gaming and itsinterdependent markets.
325. ndian Gamin Revenues of . Billion Show a . ncrease, NAT’LINDIAN GAMING COMMISSION (Sept. 12, 2018), https: www.nigc.gov newsdetail 2018-indian-gaming-revenues-of-33.7-billion-show-a-4.1-increasehttps: perma.cc WM 5-W8V .326. Alan Meister, Casino City s ndian Gamin ndustry Report, NATHAN ASSOCIATES3 (2017), https: www.nathaninc.com wp-content uploads 2017 04IGIRSummary2017-reducedsi e.pdf https: perma.cc HR4 -W74Z .327. AlanMeister NathanAssociates, Inc., he Economic mpact of ribal Gamin
A State by State Analysis, AM. GAMING ASS’N 1 (2017),https: www.americangaming.org sites default files Economic 20Impact20of 20Indian 20Gaming 20in 20the 20 .S. 20September202017.pdf https: perma.cc R 7R-45SG .328. Meister, supra note 326, at 3.329. See Rand, supra note 309, at 54.
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2. Hunting and Fishing RightsThe Supreme Court has time and again imposed sometimes costlyburdens on the States to ensure that Indian tribal hunting and fishing rightsare honored, pursuant to treaties with the nited States government. In .S.
v. Winans,330 the Supreme Court held that the State of Washington’slicensing of fishwheels interferedwith a federal treaty between the YakamaIndians and the nited States,331 giving the Tribe the right to tak e fish atall usual and accustomed places. 332 While a subsequent Supreme Courtdecision gives the State of Washington the authority to regulate tribalfishing necessary for conservation purposes,333 the underlying YakamaIndian treaty fishing rights, affirmed in Winans, endure as a restriction onthe regulatory power of the state.Similarly, in Herrera v. Wyomin ,334 the Supreme Court ruled in favor ofClayvin Herrera, a member of the Crow Tribe, who had been erroneouslyconvicted of hunting in the ighorn National Forest without a license andout of season.335 Pursuant to a federal treaty between the Crow Tribe ofIndians and the nited States,336 the Crow Tribe’s hunting rights survivedWyoming’s statehood, and Wyoming could not impose its huntingregulations on members of the tribe.337If the federal government’s protections of Indian children and familiesunder ICWA were to be held to unconstitutionally commandeer the States,the federal government’s protection of Indian hunting and fishing rightswould be thrown into question as well. ICWA rests on the plenary power ofCongress to legislate in the domain of Indian affairs, while Indian huntingand fishing rights have largely been affirmed on the basis of treaties, whichare likewise ratified by the Senate. If Congress’ plenary power over Indian
330. 198 .S. 371 (1905).331. See Treaty with the Yakima, .S.-Yakima, Mar. 8, 1859, 12 Stat. 951.332. d. at art. 3.333. See Tulee v. Washington, 315 .S. 681 (1942) (holding that while Washingtoncould not require Indians to pay a fishing license fee, it could impose onIndians equally with others purely regulatory fishing restrictions necessaryfor conservation).334. 139 S. Ct. 1686 (2019).335. d. at 1693, 1706.336. Treaty of Fort Laramie with the Crow, Crow- .S., art. 4, May 7, 1868, 15 Stat.650.337. Herrera, 139 S. Ct. at 1691-92.
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affairs ceases to be axiomatic, the authority of treaties ratified by the Senatemight be weakened as well.3. Limitations on State Regulatory Authority Over Indian CountryConsistent with tribal sovereignty and the federal interest in promotingtribal self-government, the Supreme Court has severely limited the abilityof the States to extend regulatory authority over Indian Country.338 In
Warren radin Post Co. v. Ari ona a Commission,339 the Court prohibitedthe States from taxing or otherwise burdening trade with Indians onreservations due to field preemption by Congress. In a subsequent case,
White Mountain Apache ribe v. Bracker,340 the Court further laid out abalancing test to guide a particulari ed inquiry in ad udicating stateattempts to regulate Indian Country when the regulations are not explicitlypreempted by federal law.341 The factors include the extent to which thetribe would be affected by the state’s regulation the extent to which thefederal government is already regulating the conduct that the state isseeking to regulate the nature of the state’s interest in enforcing its law onthe reservation and whether the state is providing any benefits or servicesin exchange for the burdens the state is seeking to impose.342 Tribalsovereignty plays a significant role in the analysis, given that the federal
338. Indian Country is defined as:a. all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under theurisdiction of the nited States Government, notwithstanding theissuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running throughthe reservationb. all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the nitedStates whether within the original or subsequently acquired territorythereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state and c. allIndian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not beenextinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.18 .S.C. 1151 (2018).339. 380 .S. 685 (1965).340. 448 .S. 136 (1980).341. d. at 145.342. d. at 145-53.
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government always has an interest in encouraging tribal self-sufficiencyand economic development.343Similarly, in Williams v. Lee,344 the Supreme Court held that Ari onacourts did not have urisdiction over a non-Indian who operated a generalstore on the reservation bringing suit against a member of the Nava oNation over transactions related to the store. The holding set out aninfringement test regarding state regulation over Indian country, askingwhether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians tomake their own laws and be ruled by them. 345 ustice lack further statedin the ma ority opinion that Congress has also acted consistently upon theassumption that the States have no power to regulate the affairs of Indianson a reservation. 346These rulings have been reaffirmed by subsequent cases in the SupremeCourt, restricting the ability of the States to tax and otherwise regulateaffairs in Indian Country absent Congressional authori ation. If ICWA wereto be declared unconstitutional on the basis of commandeering, the currentfederal restrictions on state regulatory authority over tribes might bethreatened as well, eopardi ing the very essence of tribal sovereignty.CONCL SIONFour decades after the passage of the Indian ChildWelfare Act, powerfulforces have converged in a coordinated effort to overturn it. In Brackeen,347ICWA’s opponents have gained traction through a novel anti-commandeering argument to draw the law into constitutional doubt. If theSupreme Court grants review in the case, ICWA could be dismantled alongwith the full corpus of federal Indian law and tribal sovereignty.The implications of overturning ICWA on anti-commandeering groundsreach beyond the scope of federal Indian law into the basic structure offederalism itself. While scholarly discussions of federalism typicallycontemplate the appropriate distribution of sovereign authority between
343. See, e. ., id. at 143 ( As we have repeatedly recogni ed, this tradition isreflected and encouraged in a number of congressional enactmentsdemonstrating a firm federal policy of promoting tribal self-sufficiency andeconomic development. ).344. 358 .S. 217 (1959).345. d. at 220.346. d.347. rackeen v. ernhardt, 937 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2019).
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only two parties the national government and the States the reality isthat Indian tribes comprise a third and equally significant player in thefederalist system.348 The dynamic, flexible, ever-changing, and difficult-to-define relationship 349 between the federal government and the States,defined through an ongoing evolutionary process of Supreme Courtopinions, constitutional language, and actual practice, 350 has alwaysdeveloped in the context of quasi-sovereign Indian tribal governments,existing within state borders, sub ect to Congressional plenary power, andowed a trust obligation by the federal government. Debates over thetreatment of Indian tribes by the States and the federal governmentinevitably shape and re-shape the balance of power between all three.Holding ICWA unconstitutional on the basis of anti-commandeeringdoctrine would permit the States to disturb the longstanding trustrelationship between the federal government and the Indian tribes. Thiswould be a tectonic shift in the existing federalist structure, akin toauthori ing the States to independently engage in foreign relations.Suddenly, the States may have vastly expanded power to regulate Indianaffairs.Additionally, applying commandeering doctrine to state courts couldwreak havoc on the legal system. While anti-commandeering doctrine wasdeveloped in large part to promote political accountability,351 an anti-commandeering decision limiting the extent to which the federalgovernment can require state courts to enforce federal law would createwidespread confusion as to the enforceability of many federal laws.Invalidating ICWA’s record-keeping requirements might threaten otherfederal regulatory schemes that require state reporting, including the
348. For a deeper discussion of federalism as a dynamic between the federalgovernment, the States, and Indian tribes, see generally Carol Tebben, An
American rifederalism Based upon the Constitutional Status of ribal ations,5 . PA. . CONST. L. 318 (2003).349. d. at 313.350. d.351. See Print v. nited States, 521 .S. 898, 935 (1997) ( y forcing stategovernments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a federalregulatory program, Members of Congress can take credit for solving’problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutionswith higher federal taxes. ) New York v. nited States, 505 .S. 144, 169(1992) ( Accountability is . . . diminished when, due to federal coercion,elected state officials cannot regulate in accordancewith the views of the localelectorate. ).
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Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS),352 theEvery Student Succeeds Act (ESSA),353 and the Patient Protection andAffordable Care Act.354Overturning a federal regulatory program that even-handedly regulates the States and private entities would likewise disruptsimilar existing schemes, such as the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act(DPPA),355 which has already been upheld by the Supreme Court.356These results seemabsurdbecause they are based on an absurd readingof existing anti-commandeering doctrine. This Note demonstrates how thecommandeering claims advanced against ICWA willfully ignore settledSupreme Court urisprudence and misconstrue the practical application ofthe statute. ICWA does not commandeer the States. While conservativegroups seeking to dismantle tribal sovereignty might cynically attempt toleverage anti-commandeering doctrine to advance their agenda, courtsshould see through the smokescreen and protect the integrity of Indianfamilies. The very existence of Indian tribes, as well as the federaliststructure as we know it, hangs in the balance.
352. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.353. Pub. L. No. 114-95, 129 Stat. 1802 (2015).354. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).355. 18 .S.C. 2721 (2000).356. See Reno v. Condon, 528 .S. 141 (2000).
